Chapter 10 and 11 of Book 1 comprise some of my favourites. However, they are very detailed and so require a short over view, especially as they cover so much ground that a straight reading and translation of the verses is not sufficient for understanding.
Both chapters cover the kinds of spies, their recruitment, roles, rewards, as well as structures of a king's espionage apparatus. Unfortunately either through time or due to loss of text, the sequence of discussion is particularly non-linear and therefore slightly confusing. But this may also be attributed to Chanakya's knowledge of certain activities and philosophies that he takes for granted and thus does not necessarily explain.
Chanakya begins by classifying nine different kinds of spies, each with a particular role and status. However, he also explains the structure of a state's intelligence apparatus, which he divides into two specific categories.
The first category is made up for five different kinds of spies that Chanakya describes as a king's five eyes. Interestingly enough, these first five are primarily deployed for internal intelligence and are meant to monitor the cabinet, influential persons of the realm as well as the general tendencies and levels of discontent in the populace. These first five are also distinguished by their primarily stationary deployment; that is, they are deployed for collecting intelligence in long-term, sometimes sleeper, capacities and are meant to report back to the king from their posts.
The second category, made up of four kinds of spies, are those who are deployed for short terms and in transitory capacity. These four kinds travel, move around, and may even be deployed in realms beyond their own.
Chanakya differentiates these two kinds of espionage by describing the first as "sanstha" and the second as "sanchaar." This may be considered an early form of dividing intelligence operators into headquarters vs field operatives, although Chanakya is quite clear that even the stationary, long term spies must have only limited knowledge of other parts of the intelligence apparatus. This, in many ways, is a function more of size than modernity, as maintaining a small core of intelligence analysts who could make sense of the information sent back is only possible when a small amount of data is generated.
However, Chanakya is quite modern on another aspect: he is quite emphatic about limiting the ways in which information is transmitted, as well as, on the paramount importance of maintaining minimum contact between different levels of espionage hierarchy. In practical terms, this means that the stationary spies communicate with only the layer above them and do not know of the various other members of the apparatus. Similarly, the high status spies - business leaders, aristocrats or intellectual - only communicate with the head of intelligence or directly with the king.
Moreover, Chanakya suggests that all kinds of people, including students, teachers, ascetics, entertainers, jugglers, beggars, traders, farmers, and so on can be recruited to serve as spies with different roles, inducements and rewards. Here it must be noted that Chanakya also makes a clear case for not only recruiting members of all classes and "castes" but also insists that spies be able to take on the necessary markers of other classes and "castes" as required (a prescient take on Rudyard Kipling's fantastic Kim here).
He is also surprisingly inclusive regarding the use of mentally and physically disabled people for gathering intelligence, acknowledging in a deeply practical manner, that many of these are least likely to be suspected. This also echoes Chanakya's organisation of the king's internal circles of protection which also include the physically and mentally challenged. In this second case, Chanakya is even more brutal in his reasoning, pointing out that gratitude may make such defenders more fierce in their loyalty to the king and thus better equipped than the able-bodied warriors.
One final point in this overview of the intelligence structure explained by Chanakya must be made as it again contradicts the simplistic notions that women were necessarily isolated or indeed marginalised in classical Indian society. Not only does Chanakya list women in the listing of nine kinds of spies, he also gives them an interesting and key mandate.
According to Chanakya, women spies must be the only conduit of information between the stationary and roaming branches of espionage, thus forming the sole crucial link between the two branches of intelligence gathering. Furthermore, in case of the "sanchaari" (roaming) spies, he insists that women spies have the responsibility of transmitting and/or transferring the gathered information to the king. In fact, Chanakya spends a fair amount of time explaining all the tactics by which the female spy can be contacted and given information by the other members of the espionage team.
This final point regarding the use of female spies flies in the face of modern (and primarily Western inspired) structures of intelligence agencies which use women for honey traps but have rarely given them executive power (the former MI5 chief is one exception). However, it echoes the view that informs the Russian security policy of "shoot the women first" in counter-insurgency operations. Chanakya makes the point elsewhere in the text which is shared at least in part by the modern Russian state that women warriors (and obviously spies) are more loyal and committed to the cause.
While I will take up the specifics of Chanakya's view on the intelligence apparatus in the next couple of posts, I believe that the most salient point raised by these chapters, is the inclusivity shown by the text which contradicts some of the post-imperialist ideas of ancient Indian history, developed over the past 200 years.
Monday, 3 January 2011
Thursday, 16 December 2010
Vetting the Cabinet: Ancient Techniques for a Modern Necessity
Book 1, Chapter 9 continued...
Quick recap of the four techniques that Chanakya provides for vetting members of a king's cabinet:
1. Test on grounds of virtue or righteousness or the test of dharma,
2. Test on grounds of greed or the test of artha,
3. Test based on physical lust or pleasure, or the test of kama,
4. Test based on fear, or the test by bhaya.
Once again, Chanakya reverts to his four key pillars of governance: wisdom, wealth, punishment and secrecy. It is also useful to link back these four tests to the four purusharthas discussed earlier in this blog, with the final test - of fear - linking to the most intrinsic yet subtle motivations for human life (moksha). This fourth - link between bhaya and moksha - is the most interesting philosophical leaps in Chanakya's work moving from political philosophy to issues of cultural ideals; I hope to develop further in the reading.
In the second part of this current chapter, Chanakya explains the appointments that ought to follow successes in each of these tests. Once again, this suggests that a king may vet cabinet members for their strengths and weakness on all or any of these grounds. More interesting is the assumption that failure on one of the tests does not necessarily bar a person from occupying a government post, but rather is used as a guide to the most appropriate government portfolios.
According to Chanakya, here are the appointments based on successes of each of the four varieties of tests:
1. Those who successfully pass the test of dharma ought to be appointed to positions dealing with law enforcement, including the judiciary. In fact, these candidates are best suited, according to the philosopher, for duties that require ethical rigour but also potentially very difficult decisions of violent punishments.
2. Those who successfully pass the test of artha are to be appointed to fiscal positions, in charge of treasury, tax collection, revenue generation and other functions in the state's management of finances.
3. Those who successfully pass the test of kama are to be appointed to oversee functioning of businesses and enterprises linked to luxury, including pleasure houses, courtesans, gambling, liquor production, and management of controlled substances in the state. In addition, these candidates are also best suited to manage the king's own living and working quarters.
An aside: I find this the most fascinating aspect of Chanakya's treatise: he views unsavoury activities as not to be banned but to be regulated by the state and thus made to contribute to the treasury. I find the innate practicality of this stance far more to my tastes than the Abrahamic texts informed and morality based laws that most states (especially western democracies and modern India) attempt to implement.
4. Those who pass the test of bhaya must be appointed to defence, protection and security areas of the goverment.
Chanakya recommends that those who pass all four tests should be granted ministerial or senior positions within the king's cabinet.
However, in a display of ruthless realpolitik, he points out that those who fail these tests are not necessarily to be discarded. Instead, he recommends that those fail the four tests ought to be appointed to manage far flung enterprises including forestry and mining, both areas that are labour intensive as well as removed from the court and capital. In context of Chanakya's later discussion of political assasssinations, this also suggests that the king may decided to get rid of such disloyal advisors in a politically expedient way without giving rise to criticism or controversy.
Once again, Chanakya refers to earlier theorists and points out that the king must also take into account the abilities and talents of those who have passed the tests and appoint them accordingly to appropriate posts. So simply passing a temperament test ought not to be the sole criterion for appointment!
Moreover, Chanakya also calls on earlier theorists (once again indicating that much of earlier political thought is now lost to us) to emphasise a key point: at no point in the tests should the king allow himself or the consort to be used in any way. This distance ensures that no ill-feeling is attached to the king and an impression of equality is maintained in the court.
He provides a further warning to the king in carrying out the four tests, advising that these be done with a maximum level of discretion. Using the metaphor of poison dissolved in water, he points out that sometimes, the mere accusation of misbehaviour or disloyalty may prompt a person to behave in that manner.
To ensure that such a person can be contained and brought back into the fold, the king must retain a distance from those conducting the test. While the secret service of the state may be used, it is necessary that the royal house remain above the practical machinations of governance, if not in practice then in image.
This chapter begins to address one of the key points of Chanakya's statecraft teachings: that of the use of secret service and spies. As mentioned earlier, secrecy is one of the four key pillars for his statecraft policy. However, unlike many later (and Western) political thinkers, Chanakya is quite clear about the ways in which spies may be used for internal and external policy making and implementation.
The next chapter begins to enter into details of formation of secret service and appointment of spies.
Till very soon...
Quick recap of the four techniques that Chanakya provides for vetting members of a king's cabinet:
1. Test on grounds of virtue or righteousness or the test of dharma,
2. Test on grounds of greed or the test of artha,
3. Test based on physical lust or pleasure, or the test of kama,
4. Test based on fear, or the test by bhaya.
Once again, Chanakya reverts to his four key pillars of governance: wisdom, wealth, punishment and secrecy. It is also useful to link back these four tests to the four purusharthas discussed earlier in this blog, with the final test - of fear - linking to the most intrinsic yet subtle motivations for human life (moksha). This fourth - link between bhaya and moksha - is the most interesting philosophical leaps in Chanakya's work moving from political philosophy to issues of cultural ideals; I hope to develop further in the reading.
In the second part of this current chapter, Chanakya explains the appointments that ought to follow successes in each of these tests. Once again, this suggests that a king may vet cabinet members for their strengths and weakness on all or any of these grounds. More interesting is the assumption that failure on one of the tests does not necessarily bar a person from occupying a government post, but rather is used as a guide to the most appropriate government portfolios.
According to Chanakya, here are the appointments based on successes of each of the four varieties of tests:
1. Those who successfully pass the test of dharma ought to be appointed to positions dealing with law enforcement, including the judiciary. In fact, these candidates are best suited, according to the philosopher, for duties that require ethical rigour but also potentially very difficult decisions of violent punishments.
2. Those who successfully pass the test of artha are to be appointed to fiscal positions, in charge of treasury, tax collection, revenue generation and other functions in the state's management of finances.
3. Those who successfully pass the test of kama are to be appointed to oversee functioning of businesses and enterprises linked to luxury, including pleasure houses, courtesans, gambling, liquor production, and management of controlled substances in the state. In addition, these candidates are also best suited to manage the king's own living and working quarters.
An aside: I find this the most fascinating aspect of Chanakya's treatise: he views unsavoury activities as not to be banned but to be regulated by the state and thus made to contribute to the treasury. I find the innate practicality of this stance far more to my tastes than the Abrahamic texts informed and morality based laws that most states (especially western democracies and modern India) attempt to implement.
4. Those who pass the test of bhaya must be appointed to defence, protection and security areas of the goverment.
Chanakya recommends that those who pass all four tests should be granted ministerial or senior positions within the king's cabinet.
However, in a display of ruthless realpolitik, he points out that those who fail these tests are not necessarily to be discarded. Instead, he recommends that those fail the four tests ought to be appointed to manage far flung enterprises including forestry and mining, both areas that are labour intensive as well as removed from the court and capital. In context of Chanakya's later discussion of political assasssinations, this also suggests that the king may decided to get rid of such disloyal advisors in a politically expedient way without giving rise to criticism or controversy.
Once again, Chanakya refers to earlier theorists and points out that the king must also take into account the abilities and talents of those who have passed the tests and appoint them accordingly to appropriate posts. So simply passing a temperament test ought not to be the sole criterion for appointment!
Moreover, Chanakya also calls on earlier theorists (once again indicating that much of earlier political thought is now lost to us) to emphasise a key point: at no point in the tests should the king allow himself or the consort to be used in any way. This distance ensures that no ill-feeling is attached to the king and an impression of equality is maintained in the court.
He provides a further warning to the king in carrying out the four tests, advising that these be done with a maximum level of discretion. Using the metaphor of poison dissolved in water, he points out that sometimes, the mere accusation of misbehaviour or disloyalty may prompt a person to behave in that manner.
To ensure that such a person can be contained and brought back into the fold, the king must retain a distance from those conducting the test. While the secret service of the state may be used, it is necessary that the royal house remain above the practical machinations of governance, if not in practice then in image.
This chapter begins to address one of the key points of Chanakya's statecraft teachings: that of the use of secret service and spies. As mentioned earlier, secrecy is one of the four key pillars for his statecraft policy. However, unlike many later (and Western) political thinkers, Chanakya is quite clear about the ways in which spies may be used for internal and external policy making and implementation.
The next chapter begins to enter into details of formation of secret service and appointment of spies.
Till very soon...
Monday, 8 November 2010
Vetting the King's Cabinet: Ancient Techniques for a Modern Necessity
First of all, apologies for the long silence since my last post. Unfortunately bureaucratic matters have taken up a lot of the past couple of months. However, onwards...
Book 1, Chapter 9:
Quite contrary to the modern practise of vetting cabinet appointments and advisors before their appointment, this chapter suggests secret ways of testing the loyalty of key appointments after they have taken up their posts. However, unlike the current practice, the vetting is meant to not check up on potential, background or indeed character traits but rather ensure loyalty and appropriate behaviour once the advisors have taken up their positions. For this, Chanakya suggests three key ways of testing loyalties and behaviour of cabinet members. Moreover, he provides specific instructions for each of these.
Before describing each of the tests, it is necessary to note that the motivations and ideas for these are guided once again by the crucial principle of the "purusharthas."
The first of these is under a very curious definition of "the virtuous solution" or the "test of virtue" or "Dharma" Chanakya suggests that the king reach a secret agreement with the royal priest and find a false pretext for dismissing him/her from the post, thus freeing the priest to appear as the injured party and carry out a secret task.
In turn, the priest then approaches any suspicious advisor, or indeed all advisors in turn, to declare the king as lacking in virtue and incapable of governance. The priest also suggests that the king ought to be replaced by a better person, determined by all the advisors. The priest must also misinform the advisors that he has spoken to the rest of the cabinet who are in agreement with such a seditous plan.
Here it is crucial to note that kingship was not necessarily determined solely by lineage in classical India. A system of limited democracy seems to have prevailed amongst the elite members of the court. In other parts of the region, a rudimentary form of democracy allowed the people to choose and/or dethrone the ruler. This early system survived at least in some of the Rajputana till the medieval era, with documents from the Sisodia court at Chittorgarh suggesting that the nobles played a crucial part in the ascension of a king.
Chanakya continues with his "test of virtue" by explaining that once a traitor is identified, mostly by his/her gullibility and agreement to the plan proposed by the royal priest, the king should soon after ensnare that advisor in some scandal and relieve him of his post.
Here it is crucial to note that, in the whole process, the advisor is never confronted openly, nor is there any suggestion of a public trial. Instead, the advisor is simply dispatched, gently and on other pretexts. This route does allow the king a lot of discretion in not only removing an advisor from the cabinet but also re-instating them to an equal or higher post should the circumstances change.
The second test is the "test of greed" (or Artha). For this test, the king uses his military chief for a similar purpose, first dismissing him and then allowing him to incite other cabinet members to rebellion. The difference here is the motivation: unlike the priest who uses persuasion and accusations of a lack of virtue against the king, the military chief is granted state funds to lure any treacherous advisors. The military chief uses the spy services to contact the cabinet members, offering them lucre in exchange for their support. The traitors are again dismissed from their posts on false charges.
The third test is the "test of lust" (or Kama). For this test, the king makes use of a female ascestic who is closely linked with the royal family and the court. Indeed, in context of Chanakya's civil code which suggests an ease of divorces, prevalence of remarriages, as well as no particular disfavour attached to widowhood, this may suggest a possible area where middle-aged or older single women - widowed or divorced - were politically active.
The ascetic establishes contact with the advisors, and sets up a honey trap. She lures the advisor with sexual intimacy, but then offers potential for money, progress, status as rewards for the advisor revolting against the king.
The fourth technique is a "test of fear." For this, the king uses one advisor who organises a boat trip, hunting trip or some other entertainment. The king not only prohibits the entertainment but also insults the organiser publicly. After this, the kings' spies approach the disappointed and annoyed advisors in guise of young students who wish for an uprising against an unjust king.
In this final option, the use of students or "brahmacharis" or those who have not yet come of age is of particular interest. I have found no other explanation in other texts, but the verse itself suggests that this last technique may work best for the younger advisors who are likely to be angered or disappointed easily.
In the remaining verses, Chanakya specifies the kinds of tasks that should be granted to the advisors who pass each test. The phrasing of these verses suggests that the advisors may be re-instated in specific positions should they fail one test but succeed in another. One risk, to me at least, of this technique is that the king may spend his first months or year in office with constant cabinet reshuffles. But, perhaps, this is a less risky option than having poor or disloyal advisors occupying the wrong office.
I hope to post the second half of the chapter later in the week. Till then, keep well.
Book 1, Chapter 9:
Quite contrary to the modern practise of vetting cabinet appointments and advisors before their appointment, this chapter suggests secret ways of testing the loyalty of key appointments after they have taken up their posts. However, unlike the current practice, the vetting is meant to not check up on potential, background or indeed character traits but rather ensure loyalty and appropriate behaviour once the advisors have taken up their positions. For this, Chanakya suggests three key ways of testing loyalties and behaviour of cabinet members. Moreover, he provides specific instructions for each of these.
Before describing each of the tests, it is necessary to note that the motivations and ideas for these are guided once again by the crucial principle of the "purusharthas."
The first of these is under a very curious definition of "the virtuous solution" or the "test of virtue" or "Dharma" Chanakya suggests that the king reach a secret agreement with the royal priest and find a false pretext for dismissing him/her from the post, thus freeing the priest to appear as the injured party and carry out a secret task.
In turn, the priest then approaches any suspicious advisor, or indeed all advisors in turn, to declare the king as lacking in virtue and incapable of governance. The priest also suggests that the king ought to be replaced by a better person, determined by all the advisors. The priest must also misinform the advisors that he has spoken to the rest of the cabinet who are in agreement with such a seditous plan.
Here it is crucial to note that kingship was not necessarily determined solely by lineage in classical India. A system of limited democracy seems to have prevailed amongst the elite members of the court. In other parts of the region, a rudimentary form of democracy allowed the people to choose and/or dethrone the ruler. This early system survived at least in some of the Rajputana till the medieval era, with documents from the Sisodia court at Chittorgarh suggesting that the nobles played a crucial part in the ascension of a king.
Chanakya continues with his "test of virtue" by explaining that once a traitor is identified, mostly by his/her gullibility and agreement to the plan proposed by the royal priest, the king should soon after ensnare that advisor in some scandal and relieve him of his post.
Here it is crucial to note that, in the whole process, the advisor is never confronted openly, nor is there any suggestion of a public trial. Instead, the advisor is simply dispatched, gently and on other pretexts. This route does allow the king a lot of discretion in not only removing an advisor from the cabinet but also re-instating them to an equal or higher post should the circumstances change.
The second test is the "test of greed" (or Artha). For this test, the king uses his military chief for a similar purpose, first dismissing him and then allowing him to incite other cabinet members to rebellion. The difference here is the motivation: unlike the priest who uses persuasion and accusations of a lack of virtue against the king, the military chief is granted state funds to lure any treacherous advisors. The military chief uses the spy services to contact the cabinet members, offering them lucre in exchange for their support. The traitors are again dismissed from their posts on false charges.
The third test is the "test of lust" (or Kama). For this test, the king makes use of a female ascestic who is closely linked with the royal family and the court. Indeed, in context of Chanakya's civil code which suggests an ease of divorces, prevalence of remarriages, as well as no particular disfavour attached to widowhood, this may suggest a possible area where middle-aged or older single women - widowed or divorced - were politically active.
The ascetic establishes contact with the advisors, and sets up a honey trap. She lures the advisor with sexual intimacy, but then offers potential for money, progress, status as rewards for the advisor revolting against the king.
The fourth technique is a "test of fear." For this, the king uses one advisor who organises a boat trip, hunting trip or some other entertainment. The king not only prohibits the entertainment but also insults the organiser publicly. After this, the kings' spies approach the disappointed and annoyed advisors in guise of young students who wish for an uprising against an unjust king.
In this final option, the use of students or "brahmacharis" or those who have not yet come of age is of particular interest. I have found no other explanation in other texts, but the verse itself suggests that this last technique may work best for the younger advisors who are likely to be angered or disappointed easily.
In the remaining verses, Chanakya specifies the kinds of tasks that should be granted to the advisors who pass each test. The phrasing of these verses suggests that the advisors may be re-instated in specific positions should they fail one test but succeed in another. One risk, to me at least, of this technique is that the king may spend his first months or year in office with constant cabinet reshuffles. But, perhaps, this is a less risky option than having poor or disloyal advisors occupying the wrong office.
I hope to post the second half of the chapter later in the week. Till then, keep well.
Tuesday, 24 August 2010
Key principles of Other Cabinet Appointments
Book 1, Chapter 8 (cont’d):
After exhaustively listing all the necessary qualities and qualifications for the prime minister, Chanakya uses the rest of this chapter for discussing other cabinet appointments as well as the selection of the royal priest.
Oddly enough, after the exhaustive list provided in the first verse regarding the prime minister’s post, the rest of the chapter seems rather perfunctory. It appears that Chanakya assumes that the king will apply the basics as pointed out earlier to the rest of his/her cabinet.
However, he does emphasise that the king must investigate the background, attitudes, loyalties and abilities of those he plans on appointing to cabinet posts. This verse seems to posit the necessity of “background checks” for all cabinet ministers, as the candidate’s aptness for the post must be confirmed by speaking with neighbours, colleagues, friends, and others in his private and professional circles.
More importantly, this background check is not only intended for politically expedient motives of confirming loyalties or ideological views. Instead, the check should be to confirm the candidate’s knowledge and abilities as well as his/her ways of thinking and acting. Indeed, here Chanakya suggests that debating competitions, professional tests and social gatherings ought to be used to test a candidate’s self-confidence, problem-solving style and aptitude, as well as their personal characteristics of patience, determination and leadership qualities.
A final point: Chanakya suggests that the king meet the candidate personally to determine their ability to not only be “sweet-spoken” but also to check for the capacity for vengefulness. I suppose after the gruelling tests the candidate would have been subjected to by this point, testing for vengefulness is a good idea!
I am beginning to wonder whether Chanakya had developed an HR competencies form and interview process? If so, it would possibly be the earliest and most comprehensive one in existence.
There is a quick digressive verse at this point in the chapter where Chanakya points out that the king has three bases for decision-making: first hand data gathered by personally witnessing an act; second hand information brought to the ruler by others; and finally, the experience gained by successfully completing a task which then provides experiential basis for any future tasks of a similar nature.
This difference is necessary for a ruler to keep in mind as no one human being is capable of carrying out all the tasks necessary for successfully running a kingdom. The king must successfully delegate administrative responsibilities or suffer two major adverse consequences: become overburdened by duties, and lose confidence of the cabinet who begin to believe that they are untrustworthy. For these reasons, stead, a king must know how to appoint the best cabinet possible to carry out the necessary duties.
Not surprisingly, as a final point, Chanakya points out a rather selfish advantage of appointing a good cabinet: the unpopular decisions are seen as being taken by the minister rather than the king, thus sparing him from popular anger.
Hmmmm... I am beginning to see that the Con-Lib coalition is making full use of this idea. In fact, I would highly recommend that Nick Clegg read Chanakya, if only to learn how to survive the Cameron-realpolitik.
The final verse in this chapter addresses the issue of appointing the royal priest. Here the interesting point is not only that the list of qualities required contains the usual knowledge of the four Vedas and astrology, as well as meditative abilities, but that the royal priest must also be fully knowledgeable in political sciences (Chanakya uses the term “dand-niti” or the term for political theory and practice here).
Of course, in addition to the personal qualities, the royal priest must also be “high born” suggesting that family lineage of the priest may provide political advantage to the king. Perhaps, here Chanakya is aware of his own times when Chandragupta Maurya lacked the family connections that may have provided political leverage in his newly acquired empire? Furthermore, Chanakya suggests that the king must maintain filial relationship with the royal priest, treating him like a teacher (guru) or father. Again, echoes of the personal?
A strange aside in this verse: that the king should trust the royal priest with his personal safety. This definitely suggests that for Chanakya, the royal priest not only has a religious and spiritual function but also a political and possibly even a military one. In conjunction with the earlier statement about choosing a high born candidate, this may suggest that Chanakya was fully aware of the “warrior-priest” phenomenon and even quite supportive of this, albeit not in a royal role.
His stand seems to go against the grain as much of the Indian political tradition warns against “priest-kings” or those who combine the Brahmin-Kshatriya traits. However, this verse seems to suggest that although the combination would be dangerous (and possibly totalitarian) in case of the king, it can be followed through in case of the royal priest by appointing a candidate with Kshatriya-Brahmin values.
The final verse explains the advantages of appointing the appropriate royal priest. A good royal priest not only protects the king but also ensures that the deities are kept content with the appropriate rituals. Finally, a successful royal priest ensures that the poor in the realm are kept loyal and happy by ensuring that wealth is redistributed amongst them.
This ends the theoretical aspect of cabinet appointments. The next chapter appears to be taken from a classical human resources manual as it explains the processes of testing the cabinet candidates.
Hope to be able to post on that chapter very soon so watch this space!
After exhaustively listing all the necessary qualities and qualifications for the prime minister, Chanakya uses the rest of this chapter for discussing other cabinet appointments as well as the selection of the royal priest.
Oddly enough, after the exhaustive list provided in the first verse regarding the prime minister’s post, the rest of the chapter seems rather perfunctory. It appears that Chanakya assumes that the king will apply the basics as pointed out earlier to the rest of his/her cabinet.
However, he does emphasise that the king must investigate the background, attitudes, loyalties and abilities of those he plans on appointing to cabinet posts. This verse seems to posit the necessity of “background checks” for all cabinet ministers, as the candidate’s aptness for the post must be confirmed by speaking with neighbours, colleagues, friends, and others in his private and professional circles.
More importantly, this background check is not only intended for politically expedient motives of confirming loyalties or ideological views. Instead, the check should be to confirm the candidate’s knowledge and abilities as well as his/her ways of thinking and acting. Indeed, here Chanakya suggests that debating competitions, professional tests and social gatherings ought to be used to test a candidate’s self-confidence, problem-solving style and aptitude, as well as their personal characteristics of patience, determination and leadership qualities.
A final point: Chanakya suggests that the king meet the candidate personally to determine their ability to not only be “sweet-spoken” but also to check for the capacity for vengefulness. I suppose after the gruelling tests the candidate would have been subjected to by this point, testing for vengefulness is a good idea!
I am beginning to wonder whether Chanakya had developed an HR competencies form and interview process? If so, it would possibly be the earliest and most comprehensive one in existence.
There is a quick digressive verse at this point in the chapter where Chanakya points out that the king has three bases for decision-making: first hand data gathered by personally witnessing an act; second hand information brought to the ruler by others; and finally, the experience gained by successfully completing a task which then provides experiential basis for any future tasks of a similar nature.
This difference is necessary for a ruler to keep in mind as no one human being is capable of carrying out all the tasks necessary for successfully running a kingdom. The king must successfully delegate administrative responsibilities or suffer two major adverse consequences: become overburdened by duties, and lose confidence of the cabinet who begin to believe that they are untrustworthy. For these reasons, stead, a king must know how to appoint the best cabinet possible to carry out the necessary duties.
Not surprisingly, as a final point, Chanakya points out a rather selfish advantage of appointing a good cabinet: the unpopular decisions are seen as being taken by the minister rather than the king, thus sparing him from popular anger.
Hmmmm... I am beginning to see that the Con-Lib coalition is making full use of this idea. In fact, I would highly recommend that Nick Clegg read Chanakya, if only to learn how to survive the Cameron-realpolitik.
The final verse in this chapter addresses the issue of appointing the royal priest. Here the interesting point is not only that the list of qualities required contains the usual knowledge of the four Vedas and astrology, as well as meditative abilities, but that the royal priest must also be fully knowledgeable in political sciences (Chanakya uses the term “dand-niti” or the term for political theory and practice here).
Of course, in addition to the personal qualities, the royal priest must also be “high born” suggesting that family lineage of the priest may provide political advantage to the king. Perhaps, here Chanakya is aware of his own times when Chandragupta Maurya lacked the family connections that may have provided political leverage in his newly acquired empire? Furthermore, Chanakya suggests that the king must maintain filial relationship with the royal priest, treating him like a teacher (guru) or father. Again, echoes of the personal?
A strange aside in this verse: that the king should trust the royal priest with his personal safety. This definitely suggests that for Chanakya, the royal priest not only has a religious and spiritual function but also a political and possibly even a military one. In conjunction with the earlier statement about choosing a high born candidate, this may suggest that Chanakya was fully aware of the “warrior-priest” phenomenon and even quite supportive of this, albeit not in a royal role.
His stand seems to go against the grain as much of the Indian political tradition warns against “priest-kings” or those who combine the Brahmin-Kshatriya traits. However, this verse seems to suggest that although the combination would be dangerous (and possibly totalitarian) in case of the king, it can be followed through in case of the royal priest by appointing a candidate with Kshatriya-Brahmin values.
The final verse explains the advantages of appointing the appropriate royal priest. A good royal priest not only protects the king but also ensures that the deities are kept content with the appropriate rituals. Finally, a successful royal priest ensures that the poor in the realm are kept loyal and happy by ensuring that wealth is redistributed amongst them.
This ends the theoretical aspect of cabinet appointments. The next chapter appears to be taken from a classical human resources manual as it explains the processes of testing the cabinet candidates.
Hope to be able to post on that chapter very soon so watch this space!
Tuesday, 20 July 2010
Appointment of the Prime Minister: Real Politik Continues
Book 1, Chapter 8
Apologies once again but deadlines intervened. But lets forge ahead nevertheless.
Chapter 8 provides a sort of job description and personnel profile for three key appointments: the prime minister, key members of cabinet and the royal priest.
Chanakya spends most time detailing the qualities that a king should seek in his prime minister or the official who will be the head of the executive branch. The very long list of qualifications for this post range from professional abilities, natural talents as well as personal type. The list that I reproduce below is fascinating not only in its far ranging criteria but also for the priorities it places on various aspects:
1. This official must not only be from the state but also deeply connected to it.
2. Free of any major addictions and bad habits. Chanakya especially considers alcoholism and drug use and promiscuity, beyond the rather wide range of permitted sexual behaviour in those times, a practical risk. It is worth noting that Chanakya's definition of sexual misbehaviour concerns risky sexual behaviour that extends to partners of other influential citizens. Adultery in the western Biblical sense was not nearly an issue in his times.
3. Must be a good rider/controller of chariot, horse, elephant and other vehicles of war
4. Must be well educated in cultural arts, including poetry, music and dance.
5. Must be well versed in political theory and practice, including of course, Arthashastra (although to be fair, Chanakya is talking of the entire corpus of political education rather than plugging his own book).
6. Intelligent, with not only 7, a good memory, but also 8, the ability to read and understand people.
Have to confess that I am not surprised that Chanakya privileges patriotism about all other qualities for this key post. What I am intrigued by - as you will notice - is that he privileges loyalty to the nation/state/kingdom/land over any personal loyalty to the king. Indeed, loyalty to the king is much lower on the list. This is especially apt as Chanakya himself held the post of the prime minister and is obviously writing from personal experience here. He appears to be quite aware of the distinction between a king's interests and that of the realm, and believes that the prime minister should act in accordance with the latter. Once again this is an early indication of a more republican and less monarchist/absolutist tendency in classical Indian political thought.
Interesting also that warrior abilities and cultural finesse take precedence in Chanakya's list over political knowledge. It is almost as if the initial criteria for the job ensures that it is open to all able citizens (nagaraka) of a state. Still, the emphasis on culture is telling, especially for our times when any sense of cultural education has been devalued as non-utilitarian (or useful for commercial enterprise).
Chanakya also spends a fair time in specifying the necessary verbal talents and abilities, explaining that the prime minister must be able to :
9. Speak appropriately, in regard to occasion and company,
10. Crush others in debate,
11. Refute (or as Sarah Palin prefers "refudiate") any untruth or propaganda in a convincing manner,
12. Spin, or create a favourable meaning from something unpleasant that is said.
Am fascinated although not surprised that the verbal/debating skills are so heavily emphasized, even though Chanakya is writing not of a professional politician in a democratic sense but a political appointee. However the need for getting the state's message out across a wide cross-section of constituencies is obviously immune to vicissitudes of history.
In addition, on a personal front, the prime minister should be 13, passionate and driven (good point!); 14, influential and convincing; 15, capable of facing adversity and opposition; 16, well behaved - not in the sense of meek but rather free of coarse or uncouth behaviour; 17, worthy of friendship; 18, capable of sticking to a decision and opinion; 19, loyal (interesting that loyalty to the king comes fairly far down this list!); 20, calm and even-tempered.
The final seven qualities may seem to repeat the earlier ones but obviously Chanakya believed they needed reiteration or more precision. These are more character traits rather abilities and include:
21, capable and strong; 22, healthy in mind and body, with no chronic weakness or ailment; 23, steadfast, and calm in moments of crisis; 24, modest and without arrogance; 25, stable in moods, and thus not likely to waver; and 26, pleasant looking (I guess leaders had to be presentable even in ancient times!).
And finally, 27, the prime minister should not be vengeful or indeed have any long standing enmities. Strangely prescient this bit, in light of Peter Mandelson's memoirs of the Blair-Brown years in government. Perhaps, Chanakya should be made compulsory reading for all aspiring politicians!
Chanakya ends this section with a wonderful recommendation: a king should attempt to find a person with these 27 qualities for the prime minister's post, as one possessing all the listed qualities is the superlative one for the job. However, in the spirit of practicality, he ends with pointing out that a person with a quarter of the listed qualities is a mediocre prime minister. Implicit in this suggestion is that in the absence of a great prime minister, a mediocre one may be necessary, although in case of the latter, the king should be aware of the fact and thus keep a close watch.
The next two sections of this chapter are on qualities of the cabinet minister and the royal priest. I hope to include those as soon as possible. I do have to confess to having a slight bout of RSI, which means typing is a (literal) pain.
Apologies once again but deadlines intervened. But lets forge ahead nevertheless.
Chapter 8 provides a sort of job description and personnel profile for three key appointments: the prime minister, key members of cabinet and the royal priest.
Chanakya spends most time detailing the qualities that a king should seek in his prime minister or the official who will be the head of the executive branch. The very long list of qualifications for this post range from professional abilities, natural talents as well as personal type. The list that I reproduce below is fascinating not only in its far ranging criteria but also for the priorities it places on various aspects:
1. This official must not only be from the state but also deeply connected to it.
2. Free of any major addictions and bad habits. Chanakya especially considers alcoholism and drug use and promiscuity, beyond the rather wide range of permitted sexual behaviour in those times, a practical risk. It is worth noting that Chanakya's definition of sexual misbehaviour concerns risky sexual behaviour that extends to partners of other influential citizens. Adultery in the western Biblical sense was not nearly an issue in his times.
3. Must be a good rider/controller of chariot, horse, elephant and other vehicles of war
4. Must be well educated in cultural arts, including poetry, music and dance.
5. Must be well versed in political theory and practice, including of course, Arthashastra (although to be fair, Chanakya is talking of the entire corpus of political education rather than plugging his own book).
6. Intelligent, with not only 7, a good memory, but also 8, the ability to read and understand people.
Have to confess that I am not surprised that Chanakya privileges patriotism about all other qualities for this key post. What I am intrigued by - as you will notice - is that he privileges loyalty to the nation/state/kingdom/land over any personal loyalty to the king. Indeed, loyalty to the king is much lower on the list. This is especially apt as Chanakya himself held the post of the prime minister and is obviously writing from personal experience here. He appears to be quite aware of the distinction between a king's interests and that of the realm, and believes that the prime minister should act in accordance with the latter. Once again this is an early indication of a more republican and less monarchist/absolutist tendency in classical Indian political thought.
Interesting also that warrior abilities and cultural finesse take precedence in Chanakya's list over political knowledge. It is almost as if the initial criteria for the job ensures that it is open to all able citizens (nagaraka) of a state. Still, the emphasis on culture is telling, especially for our times when any sense of cultural education has been devalued as non-utilitarian (or useful for commercial enterprise).
Chanakya also spends a fair time in specifying the necessary verbal talents and abilities, explaining that the prime minister must be able to :
9. Speak appropriately, in regard to occasion and company,
10. Crush others in debate,
11. Refute (or as Sarah Palin prefers "refudiate") any untruth or propaganda in a convincing manner,
12. Spin, or create a favourable meaning from something unpleasant that is said.
Am fascinated although not surprised that the verbal/debating skills are so heavily emphasized, even though Chanakya is writing not of a professional politician in a democratic sense but a political appointee. However the need for getting the state's message out across a wide cross-section of constituencies is obviously immune to vicissitudes of history.
In addition, on a personal front, the prime minister should be 13, passionate and driven (good point!); 14, influential and convincing; 15, capable of facing adversity and opposition; 16, well behaved - not in the sense of meek but rather free of coarse or uncouth behaviour; 17, worthy of friendship; 18, capable of sticking to a decision and opinion; 19, loyal (interesting that loyalty to the king comes fairly far down this list!); 20, calm and even-tempered.
The final seven qualities may seem to repeat the earlier ones but obviously Chanakya believed they needed reiteration or more precision. These are more character traits rather abilities and include:
21, capable and strong; 22, healthy in mind and body, with no chronic weakness or ailment; 23, steadfast, and calm in moments of crisis; 24, modest and without arrogance; 25, stable in moods, and thus not likely to waver; and 26, pleasant looking (I guess leaders had to be presentable even in ancient times!).
And finally, 27, the prime minister should not be vengeful or indeed have any long standing enmities. Strangely prescient this bit, in light of Peter Mandelson's memoirs of the Blair-Brown years in government. Perhaps, Chanakya should be made compulsory reading for all aspiring politicians!
Chanakya ends this section with a wonderful recommendation: a king should attempt to find a person with these 27 qualities for the prime minister's post, as one possessing all the listed qualities is the superlative one for the job. However, in the spirit of practicality, he ends with pointing out that a person with a quarter of the listed qualities is a mediocre prime minister. Implicit in this suggestion is that in the absence of a great prime minister, a mediocre one may be necessary, although in case of the latter, the king should be aware of the fact and thus keep a close watch.
The next two sections of this chapter are on qualities of the cabinet minister and the royal priest. I hope to include those as soon as possible. I do have to confess to having a slight bout of RSI, which means typing is a (literal) pain.
Thursday, 6 May 2010
Guidance for Appointing Key Advisors: Now the Realpolitik Begins
Book 1, Chapter 7
It seems ironically appropriate to be writing of Chanakya's view on appointing key advisors and ministers on the day that UK heads to a change in government. But idle musings aside, lets plow ahead.
At the beginning of the chapter, Chanakya returns to summarising views of others on this rather key political and administrative matter. Actually this is one of the most interesting chapters as it summarises a lot of contemporary political debate regarding realpolitik, loyalty and the rational bases for a king's decisionmaking processes. A lot of the discussion seems extraordinarily modern.
The first source, of Acharya Bhardwaj, is obviously the orthodox one. Bhardawaj believes the the king's key advisors should be drawn from his classmates, as the king knows them well enough to judge their ability and trustworthiness. In addition, they will be loyal given their prior friendship with the king.
Hmmm...seems like oligarchies have long been the preferred mode of governance by the political orthodoxies!
However, this view is contradicted by Acharya Parashar who believes that having seen the king in compromising, nonserious, playful and possibly even humiliating situations, lifelong friends make inappopriate advisors and ministers. These advisors will always be able to insult the king, while the king will not be able to maintain the requisite professional distance from them.
According to Parashar, a king should appoint those who support his secret and/or private projects. These people are driven by a fear of their secret interests and activities being revealed and will thus remain loyal to the king. In addition, the fear will ensure they will never insult or denigrate the king or royal interests.
This appears to be an early articulation of the fear/greed motivations that so much political science, economics and international relations uses in contemporary times!
However, both the views are contested by Acharya Vishalaksha who insists that this fear of secrets being revealed applies to both parties. Just as the advisors are afraid of the king knowing their secrets, the king too will be burdened by his secret activities being known to his advisors. A king whose secrets are known to others may end up as a puppet in the hands of his advisors. Indeed Vishalaksha points out that the moment a king shares his secret plans or activities with an advisor, he loses control of the person.
Parashar counters and expands this discussion by suggesting that the king should appoint those who have proven their loyalty and affection by putting their own lives on the line for the safety and wellbeing of the king.
This view is countered by Acharya Pishun who dismisses these loyalists as "royal devotees" and points out that loyalty has little to do with ability. Instead he suggests that key advisors and ministers should be chosen based on their prior record and proven ability. He emphasises that ability, dedication and capacity for work are not only necessary for key posts, but critical for the efficient running of a realm. In his view key appointments should be driven by ability, according to Pishun, thus creating an early case for a strict meritocracy.
Similarly, Acharya Kaudpadanta also does not believe loyalty is enough for advisors. However, he takes a more conservative approach, suggesting that hereditary traditions are a good way of choosing key advisors. Kaudpadanta believes in a plutocracy, suggesting that the hereditary elite are intimately familiar with the workings of a government and court and thus best suited for key positions. He further suggests that these hereditary elite are not swayed by rewards or by being unpopular with the king, but are guided by a sort of genetic noblesse oblige.
Funnily enough, he suggests that this form of behaviour is more natural, pointing to cows that prefer their old homes rather than new ones.
But it doesn't end there: Kaudpadanta is refuted by Acharya Vatvyadhi who points out that such a hereditary plutocracy creates trouble for a king, as it believes itself entitled to certain privileges. Vatvyadhi lists money, power, even sex, as possible areas of entitled privileges that a hereditary elite may claim for itself, despite the intentions of the king or the welfare of the realm.
He also appears to think that removing such an elite from the politically powerful posts can be a problem for a king, which makes their elevation to such posts a very
risky proposition. Moreover, he points to the fact that such a hereditary elite would have shared moments of upbringing with the king, making them privy to his weakness and early humiliations (echoing the risks articulated by Parashar earlier).
Indeed Vatvyadhi recommends selecting the best prepared people from a pool of new, educated and well prepared experts. He suggests that a lack of intimacy and prior history ensures a better discipline amongst advisors as they continue to respect and fear the king.
This view is countered by Acharya Bahudantiputra (often also named Indra). He points out that ability and preparation are not enough for a king's advisor. Inexperienced ministers and officials may panic in a moment of crisis, just when the king requires their support. Instead he suggests that instead of "expertise", a king should appoint wise, loyal, patient and steady persons to key positions, who can support him in moments of crisis. He insists that key officials are more appropriately chosen based on their characters rather than their expertise.
At this point, the chapter shifts to Chanakya's voice. He considers the above views as appropriate in their particular contexts but begins to formulate his own theories on such key appointments.
Not surprisingly, he takes an extremely pragmatic view of the situation, pointing out that all the views are useful but a king must decide - based on the situation and the times - the criteria that is most useful to him. Thus, loyalty, steadiness, expertise, lack of experience, experience are all potentially useful, but a king must decide what is needed.
Chanakya does warn that key advisors may be drawn from a large group - those who are close to the king, or new to him, experienced or inexperienced - however, key ministerial (official) posts must be limited and appointed with far greater care.
Indeed, Chanakya gives greater importance to officials with executive powers rather than to advisors, ensuring that the administrative roles are performed by people that the king has chosen with far greater care.
The next chapter takes on the issue of these appointments in greater (and practical) detail. Indeed, Chanakya seems to draw up a rather comprehensive job description and core skills/abilities list, which may serve even today as a guide. This will take some time to digest but I hope to get through that in the next few days, so keep an eye out for an update.
It seems ironically appropriate to be writing of Chanakya's view on appointing key advisors and ministers on the day that UK heads to a change in government. But idle musings aside, lets plow ahead.
At the beginning of the chapter, Chanakya returns to summarising views of others on this rather key political and administrative matter. Actually this is one of the most interesting chapters as it summarises a lot of contemporary political debate regarding realpolitik, loyalty and the rational bases for a king's decisionmaking processes. A lot of the discussion seems extraordinarily modern.
The first source, of Acharya Bhardwaj, is obviously the orthodox one. Bhardawaj believes the the king's key advisors should be drawn from his classmates, as the king knows them well enough to judge their ability and trustworthiness. In addition, they will be loyal given their prior friendship with the king.
Hmmm...seems like oligarchies have long been the preferred mode of governance by the political orthodoxies!
However, this view is contradicted by Acharya Parashar who believes that having seen the king in compromising, nonserious, playful and possibly even humiliating situations, lifelong friends make inappopriate advisors and ministers. These advisors will always be able to insult the king, while the king will not be able to maintain the requisite professional distance from them.
According to Parashar, a king should appoint those who support his secret and/or private projects. These people are driven by a fear of their secret interests and activities being revealed and will thus remain loyal to the king. In addition, the fear will ensure they will never insult or denigrate the king or royal interests.
This appears to be an early articulation of the fear/greed motivations that so much political science, economics and international relations uses in contemporary times!
However, both the views are contested by Acharya Vishalaksha who insists that this fear of secrets being revealed applies to both parties. Just as the advisors are afraid of the king knowing their secrets, the king too will be burdened by his secret activities being known to his advisors. A king whose secrets are known to others may end up as a puppet in the hands of his advisors. Indeed Vishalaksha points out that the moment a king shares his secret plans or activities with an advisor, he loses control of the person.
Parashar counters and expands this discussion by suggesting that the king should appoint those who have proven their loyalty and affection by putting their own lives on the line for the safety and wellbeing of the king.
This view is countered by Acharya Pishun who dismisses these loyalists as "royal devotees" and points out that loyalty has little to do with ability. Instead he suggests that key advisors and ministers should be chosen based on their prior record and proven ability. He emphasises that ability, dedication and capacity for work are not only necessary for key posts, but critical for the efficient running of a realm. In his view key appointments should be driven by ability, according to Pishun, thus creating an early case for a strict meritocracy.
Similarly, Acharya Kaudpadanta also does not believe loyalty is enough for advisors. However, he takes a more conservative approach, suggesting that hereditary traditions are a good way of choosing key advisors. Kaudpadanta believes in a plutocracy, suggesting that the hereditary elite are intimately familiar with the workings of a government and court and thus best suited for key positions. He further suggests that these hereditary elite are not swayed by rewards or by being unpopular with the king, but are guided by a sort of genetic noblesse oblige.
Funnily enough, he suggests that this form of behaviour is more natural, pointing to cows that prefer their old homes rather than new ones.
But it doesn't end there: Kaudpadanta is refuted by Acharya Vatvyadhi who points out that such a hereditary plutocracy creates trouble for a king, as it believes itself entitled to certain privileges. Vatvyadhi lists money, power, even sex, as possible areas of entitled privileges that a hereditary elite may claim for itself, despite the intentions of the king or the welfare of the realm.
He also appears to think that removing such an elite from the politically powerful posts can be a problem for a king, which makes their elevation to such posts a very
risky proposition. Moreover, he points to the fact that such a hereditary elite would have shared moments of upbringing with the king, making them privy to his weakness and early humiliations (echoing the risks articulated by Parashar earlier).
Indeed Vatvyadhi recommends selecting the best prepared people from a pool of new, educated and well prepared experts. He suggests that a lack of intimacy and prior history ensures a better discipline amongst advisors as they continue to respect and fear the king.
This view is countered by Acharya Bahudantiputra (often also named Indra). He points out that ability and preparation are not enough for a king's advisor. Inexperienced ministers and officials may panic in a moment of crisis, just when the king requires their support. Instead he suggests that instead of "expertise", a king should appoint wise, loyal, patient and steady persons to key positions, who can support him in moments of crisis. He insists that key officials are more appropriately chosen based on their characters rather than their expertise.
At this point, the chapter shifts to Chanakya's voice. He considers the above views as appropriate in their particular contexts but begins to formulate his own theories on such key appointments.
Not surprisingly, he takes an extremely pragmatic view of the situation, pointing out that all the views are useful but a king must decide - based on the situation and the times - the criteria that is most useful to him. Thus, loyalty, steadiness, expertise, lack of experience, experience are all potentially useful, but a king must decide what is needed.
Chanakya does warn that key advisors may be drawn from a large group - those who are close to the king, or new to him, experienced or inexperienced - however, key ministerial (official) posts must be limited and appointed with far greater care.
Indeed, Chanakya gives greater importance to officials with executive powers rather than to advisors, ensuring that the administrative roles are performed by people that the king has chosen with far greater care.
The next chapter takes on the issue of these appointments in greater (and practical) detail. Indeed, Chanakya seems to draw up a rather comprehensive job description and core skills/abilities list, which may serve even today as a guide. This will take some time to digest but I hope to get through that in the next few days, so keep an eye out for an update.
Sunday, 14 March 2010
Guidance for a King's Behaviour: Getting to the Nitty Gritty Now
Book 1, Chapter 6:
Having covered a fair amount of ground on all a king must learn, Chanakya moves on to more practical matters. This chapter is quite succint, with only 6 verses although they are packed tight with advice and strictures.
He begins with referencing control over one's senses as outlined in the chapter before and recommends that a king avoid the losses resulting from succumbing to lust, greed etc, and attempt to live in a disciplined manner.
But after that general advice, the verse gets quite specific as to what a king must do (once again the key point is action and not thought or words). Chanakya reiterates out that the king should keep company of knowledgeable and wise people, selected on their basis of knowledge, age and experience.
With help of these sage advisors, the king must focus on the following: develop his/her own intellect and abilities, as well as use spies/intelligence networks to learn more about one's own realm as well as about neighbouring and enemy states.
Ah, here comes the best bit: a king must simultaneously work towards economic improvement and through this wealth creation, help social development, education and progress of the subjects. At the same time as helping the populace gain social stability and economic prosperity, the king should use the economic development to encourage education and intellectual activity as well as establish strict laws to ensure law and order. The king must reward prominent citizens for their contributions (intellectual and material) at regular intervals.
How very modern! Now comes the use of spin as a political tool: Intellectuals, sages, and prominent thinkers should be rewarded with status and cash as part of improving and maintaining the king's reputation! As always with Chanakya, he appeals most to self-interest rather than instincts of charity.
A final stricture in this verse is that a king must do all these tasks consistently in order to assure the populace that he/she is not only aware and interested in their welfare but also absolutely dedicated to that goal. Oh, our politicians could so learn from old guru Chanakya!
The next set of strictures are for all that a king must avoid. These include sex with women who are married to others (sounds logical!), taking others property or rights (again logical as this would create resentment), and finally, murder and/or wanton destruction of life. These seem to be actions that destabilise a king's reputation as well as control.
However the following strictures are also terrifically on the mark and very modern: a king must keep a regular sleep routine, not sleep too much, not be caught dozing during public acts (boredom was a problem even in ancient times); nor should a king behave in lewd manner, joke with officials, or tell untruths. Moreover, the king should not wear inappropriate clothing or behave in inappropriate way. This again is not for any great moral reason, but rather because these lead to the populace losing faith in a king's abilities and dedication to their interest, and hence to a loss of power and influence.
Almost as if afraid that the above list may put off any aspiring rulers, Chanakya softens his stance in the next verse explaining that a king is not prohibited from enjoyment. Material (and thus physical) pleasures are very much available to a king.
However, for purposes of maintaining power, a king must balance out the three key purusharthas: dharma, artha and kama. This is fascinating as he leaves out moksha as the fourth human goal in its entirety. This may be partly due to the material focus of his treatise, but also because he seems to implicitly assume that a balanced pursuit of the three others shall automatically lead to the fourth. This seems to an incredibly pragmatic approach and one that fits with the purposes of the text.
In the verse, Chanakya also warns against the privileging one of three over the others. Having dealt with the dangers of the excesses of artha and kama in the chapter before, he clarifies that dharma also is bad in excess. Although a king must be righteous, an excess of religiosity (or indeed virtue) is unacceptable and dangerous in a king (someone give a copy of this text to the US Republicans as well as the Taliban!). In fact any imbalance between the practice of these three purusharthas leads to political and social unrest and a loss of power (that carrot-and-stick again).
Here Chanakya inserts an aside, insisting that of the three: dharma, kama and artha, it is artha (or economic prosperity) that is most important. With money, one may act with virtue and according to religious requirements; one may also fulfill one's material and physical desires. Lack of wealth however means that neither kama nor dharma can be achieved. I am guessing that all those new age junkies who think of India as the great spiritual retreat obviously never got around to reading Chanakya!
A final set of injunctions: a king must grant the key ministers, advisors and teachers the right to stop him/her from behaving inappropriately. And he tops this with a brilliant example: Should a king lose control when drinking, these key advisors must step in to prevent such weakness being known widely, as well as warn the king against its dangers. There appears to be the implicit suggestion that the advisors should also act as checks to ensure the king's behaviour does not endanger him. Its a bit like having a royal designated driver! Here Chanakya is specific enough to point out that these advisors should check or critique the king in private, not public (very effective, logical and modern).
Should the advisors not have the right to intervene when a king behaves inappropriately, there will be no external check on a ruler, and this can only result in loss of status, power and eventually the realm.
Finally, Chanakya reminds the king (also a reminder to the reader that the text is meant for aspiring leaders), that a king cannot succeed alone. Indeed a king's success is in large part due to good advisors and ministers, who are able to guide as well as check a king's excesses.
He ends by pointing out that a king with good advisor should be considered fortunate. Moreover, a king should be able to reward an advisor who helps maintain his/her reputation and intervenes to check his/her excesses.
Having covered a fair amount of ground on all a king must learn, Chanakya moves on to more practical matters. This chapter is quite succint, with only 6 verses although they are packed tight with advice and strictures.
He begins with referencing control over one's senses as outlined in the chapter before and recommends that a king avoid the losses resulting from succumbing to lust, greed etc, and attempt to live in a disciplined manner.
But after that general advice, the verse gets quite specific as to what a king must do (once again the key point is action and not thought or words). Chanakya reiterates out that the king should keep company of knowledgeable and wise people, selected on their basis of knowledge, age and experience.
With help of these sage advisors, the king must focus on the following: develop his/her own intellect and abilities, as well as use spies/intelligence networks to learn more about one's own realm as well as about neighbouring and enemy states.
Ah, here comes the best bit: a king must simultaneously work towards economic improvement and through this wealth creation, help social development, education and progress of the subjects. At the same time as helping the populace gain social stability and economic prosperity, the king should use the economic development to encourage education and intellectual activity as well as establish strict laws to ensure law and order. The king must reward prominent citizens for their contributions (intellectual and material) at regular intervals.
How very modern! Now comes the use of spin as a political tool: Intellectuals, sages, and prominent thinkers should be rewarded with status and cash as part of improving and maintaining the king's reputation! As always with Chanakya, he appeals most to self-interest rather than instincts of charity.
A final stricture in this verse is that a king must do all these tasks consistently in order to assure the populace that he/she is not only aware and interested in their welfare but also absolutely dedicated to that goal. Oh, our politicians could so learn from old guru Chanakya!
The next set of strictures are for all that a king must avoid. These include sex with women who are married to others (sounds logical!), taking others property or rights (again logical as this would create resentment), and finally, murder and/or wanton destruction of life. These seem to be actions that destabilise a king's reputation as well as control.
However the following strictures are also terrifically on the mark and very modern: a king must keep a regular sleep routine, not sleep too much, not be caught dozing during public acts (boredom was a problem even in ancient times); nor should a king behave in lewd manner, joke with officials, or tell untruths. Moreover, the king should not wear inappropriate clothing or behave in inappropriate way. This again is not for any great moral reason, but rather because these lead to the populace losing faith in a king's abilities and dedication to their interest, and hence to a loss of power and influence.
Almost as if afraid that the above list may put off any aspiring rulers, Chanakya softens his stance in the next verse explaining that a king is not prohibited from enjoyment. Material (and thus physical) pleasures are very much available to a king.
However, for purposes of maintaining power, a king must balance out the three key purusharthas: dharma, artha and kama. This is fascinating as he leaves out moksha as the fourth human goal in its entirety. This may be partly due to the material focus of his treatise, but also because he seems to implicitly assume that a balanced pursuit of the three others shall automatically lead to the fourth. This seems to an incredibly pragmatic approach and one that fits with the purposes of the text.
In the verse, Chanakya also warns against the privileging one of three over the others. Having dealt with the dangers of the excesses of artha and kama in the chapter before, he clarifies that dharma also is bad in excess. Although a king must be righteous, an excess of religiosity (or indeed virtue) is unacceptable and dangerous in a king (someone give a copy of this text to the US Republicans as well as the Taliban!). In fact any imbalance between the practice of these three purusharthas leads to political and social unrest and a loss of power (that carrot-and-stick again).
Here Chanakya inserts an aside, insisting that of the three: dharma, kama and artha, it is artha (or economic prosperity) that is most important. With money, one may act with virtue and according to religious requirements; one may also fulfill one's material and physical desires. Lack of wealth however means that neither kama nor dharma can be achieved. I am guessing that all those new age junkies who think of India as the great spiritual retreat obviously never got around to reading Chanakya!
A final set of injunctions: a king must grant the key ministers, advisors and teachers the right to stop him/her from behaving inappropriately. And he tops this with a brilliant example: Should a king lose control when drinking, these key advisors must step in to prevent such weakness being known widely, as well as warn the king against its dangers. There appears to be the implicit suggestion that the advisors should also act as checks to ensure the king's behaviour does not endanger him. Its a bit like having a royal designated driver! Here Chanakya is specific enough to point out that these advisors should check or critique the king in private, not public (very effective, logical and modern).
Should the advisors not have the right to intervene when a king behaves inappropriately, there will be no external check on a ruler, and this can only result in loss of status, power and eventually the realm.
Finally, Chanakya reminds the king (also a reminder to the reader that the text is meant for aspiring leaders), that a king cannot succeed alone. Indeed a king's success is in large part due to good advisors and ministers, who are able to guide as well as check a king's excesses.
He ends by pointing out that a king with good advisor should be considered fortunate. Moreover, a king should be able to reward an advisor who helps maintain his/her reputation and intervenes to check his/her excesses.
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