Book 1, Chapter 9 continued...
Quick recap of the four techniques that Chanakya provides for vetting members of a king's cabinet:
1. Test on grounds of virtue or righteousness or the test of dharma,
2. Test on grounds of greed or the test of artha,
3. Test based on physical lust or pleasure, or the test of kama,
4. Test based on fear, or the test by bhaya.
Once again, Chanakya reverts to his four key pillars of governance: wisdom, wealth, punishment and secrecy. It is also useful to link back these four tests to the four purusharthas discussed earlier in this blog, with the final test - of fear - linking to the most intrinsic yet subtle motivations for human life (moksha). This fourth - link between bhaya and moksha - is the most interesting philosophical leaps in Chanakya's work moving from political philosophy to issues of cultural ideals; I hope to develop further in the reading.
In the second part of this current chapter, Chanakya explains the appointments that ought to follow successes in each of these tests. Once again, this suggests that a king may vet cabinet members for their strengths and weakness on all or any of these grounds. More interesting is the assumption that failure on one of the tests does not necessarily bar a person from occupying a government post, but rather is used as a guide to the most appropriate government portfolios.
According to Chanakya, here are the appointments based on successes of each of the four varieties of tests:
1. Those who successfully pass the test of dharma ought to be appointed to positions dealing with law enforcement, including the judiciary. In fact, these candidates are best suited, according to the philosopher, for duties that require ethical rigour but also potentially very difficult decisions of violent punishments.
2. Those who successfully pass the test of artha are to be appointed to fiscal positions, in charge of treasury, tax collection, revenue generation and other functions in the state's management of finances.
3. Those who successfully pass the test of kama are to be appointed to oversee functioning of businesses and enterprises linked to luxury, including pleasure houses, courtesans, gambling, liquor production, and management of controlled substances in the state. In addition, these candidates are also best suited to manage the king's own living and working quarters.
An aside: I find this the most fascinating aspect of Chanakya's treatise: he views unsavoury activities as not to be banned but to be regulated by the state and thus made to contribute to the treasury. I find the innate practicality of this stance far more to my tastes than the Abrahamic texts informed and morality based laws that most states (especially western democracies and modern India) attempt to implement.
4. Those who pass the test of bhaya must be appointed to defence, protection and security areas of the goverment.
Chanakya recommends that those who pass all four tests should be granted ministerial or senior positions within the king's cabinet.
However, in a display of ruthless realpolitik, he points out that those who fail these tests are not necessarily to be discarded. Instead, he recommends that those fail the four tests ought to be appointed to manage far flung enterprises including forestry and mining, both areas that are labour intensive as well as removed from the court and capital. In context of Chanakya's later discussion of political assasssinations, this also suggests that the king may decided to get rid of such disloyal advisors in a politically expedient way without giving rise to criticism or controversy.
Once again, Chanakya refers to earlier theorists and points out that the king must also take into account the abilities and talents of those who have passed the tests and appoint them accordingly to appropriate posts. So simply passing a temperament test ought not to be the sole criterion for appointment!
Moreover, Chanakya also calls on earlier theorists (once again indicating that much of earlier political thought is now lost to us) to emphasise a key point: at no point in the tests should the king allow himself or the consort to be used in any way. This distance ensures that no ill-feeling is attached to the king and an impression of equality is maintained in the court.
He provides a further warning to the king in carrying out the four tests, advising that these be done with a maximum level of discretion. Using the metaphor of poison dissolved in water, he points out that sometimes, the mere accusation of misbehaviour or disloyalty may prompt a person to behave in that manner.
To ensure that such a person can be contained and brought back into the fold, the king must retain a distance from those conducting the test. While the secret service of the state may be used, it is necessary that the royal house remain above the practical machinations of governance, if not in practice then in image.
This chapter begins to address one of the key points of Chanakya's statecraft teachings: that of the use of secret service and spies. As mentioned earlier, secrecy is one of the four key pillars for his statecraft policy. However, unlike many later (and Western) political thinkers, Chanakya is quite clear about the ways in which spies may be used for internal and external policy making and implementation.
The next chapter begins to enter into details of formation of secret service and appointment of spies.
Till very soon...
Showing posts with label tests. Show all posts
Showing posts with label tests. Show all posts
Thursday, 16 December 2010
Monday, 8 November 2010
Vetting the King's Cabinet: Ancient Techniques for a Modern Necessity
First of all, apologies for the long silence since my last post. Unfortunately bureaucratic matters have taken up a lot of the past couple of months. However, onwards...
Book 1, Chapter 9:
Quite contrary to the modern practise of vetting cabinet appointments and advisors before their appointment, this chapter suggests secret ways of testing the loyalty of key appointments after they have taken up their posts. However, unlike the current practice, the vetting is meant to not check up on potential, background or indeed character traits but rather ensure loyalty and appropriate behaviour once the advisors have taken up their positions. For this, Chanakya suggests three key ways of testing loyalties and behaviour of cabinet members. Moreover, he provides specific instructions for each of these.
Before describing each of the tests, it is necessary to note that the motivations and ideas for these are guided once again by the crucial principle of the "purusharthas."
The first of these is under a very curious definition of "the virtuous solution" or the "test of virtue" or "Dharma" Chanakya suggests that the king reach a secret agreement with the royal priest and find a false pretext for dismissing him/her from the post, thus freeing the priest to appear as the injured party and carry out a secret task.
In turn, the priest then approaches any suspicious advisor, or indeed all advisors in turn, to declare the king as lacking in virtue and incapable of governance. The priest also suggests that the king ought to be replaced by a better person, determined by all the advisors. The priest must also misinform the advisors that he has spoken to the rest of the cabinet who are in agreement with such a seditous plan.
Here it is crucial to note that kingship was not necessarily determined solely by lineage in classical India. A system of limited democracy seems to have prevailed amongst the elite members of the court. In other parts of the region, a rudimentary form of democracy allowed the people to choose and/or dethrone the ruler. This early system survived at least in some of the Rajputana till the medieval era, with documents from the Sisodia court at Chittorgarh suggesting that the nobles played a crucial part in the ascension of a king.
Chanakya continues with his "test of virtue" by explaining that once a traitor is identified, mostly by his/her gullibility and agreement to the plan proposed by the royal priest, the king should soon after ensnare that advisor in some scandal and relieve him of his post.
Here it is crucial to note that, in the whole process, the advisor is never confronted openly, nor is there any suggestion of a public trial. Instead, the advisor is simply dispatched, gently and on other pretexts. This route does allow the king a lot of discretion in not only removing an advisor from the cabinet but also re-instating them to an equal or higher post should the circumstances change.
The second test is the "test of greed" (or Artha). For this test, the king uses his military chief for a similar purpose, first dismissing him and then allowing him to incite other cabinet members to rebellion. The difference here is the motivation: unlike the priest who uses persuasion and accusations of a lack of virtue against the king, the military chief is granted state funds to lure any treacherous advisors. The military chief uses the spy services to contact the cabinet members, offering them lucre in exchange for their support. The traitors are again dismissed from their posts on false charges.
The third test is the "test of lust" (or Kama). For this test, the king makes use of a female ascestic who is closely linked with the royal family and the court. Indeed, in context of Chanakya's civil code which suggests an ease of divorces, prevalence of remarriages, as well as no particular disfavour attached to widowhood, this may suggest a possible area where middle-aged or older single women - widowed or divorced - were politically active.
The ascetic establishes contact with the advisors, and sets up a honey trap. She lures the advisor with sexual intimacy, but then offers potential for money, progress, status as rewards for the advisor revolting against the king.
The fourth technique is a "test of fear." For this, the king uses one advisor who organises a boat trip, hunting trip or some other entertainment. The king not only prohibits the entertainment but also insults the organiser publicly. After this, the kings' spies approach the disappointed and annoyed advisors in guise of young students who wish for an uprising against an unjust king.
In this final option, the use of students or "brahmacharis" or those who have not yet come of age is of particular interest. I have found no other explanation in other texts, but the verse itself suggests that this last technique may work best for the younger advisors who are likely to be angered or disappointed easily.
In the remaining verses, Chanakya specifies the kinds of tasks that should be granted to the advisors who pass each test. The phrasing of these verses suggests that the advisors may be re-instated in specific positions should they fail one test but succeed in another. One risk, to me at least, of this technique is that the king may spend his first months or year in office with constant cabinet reshuffles. But, perhaps, this is a less risky option than having poor or disloyal advisors occupying the wrong office.
I hope to post the second half of the chapter later in the week. Till then, keep well.
Book 1, Chapter 9:
Quite contrary to the modern practise of vetting cabinet appointments and advisors before their appointment, this chapter suggests secret ways of testing the loyalty of key appointments after they have taken up their posts. However, unlike the current practice, the vetting is meant to not check up on potential, background or indeed character traits but rather ensure loyalty and appropriate behaviour once the advisors have taken up their positions. For this, Chanakya suggests three key ways of testing loyalties and behaviour of cabinet members. Moreover, he provides specific instructions for each of these.
Before describing each of the tests, it is necessary to note that the motivations and ideas for these are guided once again by the crucial principle of the "purusharthas."
The first of these is under a very curious definition of "the virtuous solution" or the "test of virtue" or "Dharma" Chanakya suggests that the king reach a secret agreement with the royal priest and find a false pretext for dismissing him/her from the post, thus freeing the priest to appear as the injured party and carry out a secret task.
In turn, the priest then approaches any suspicious advisor, or indeed all advisors in turn, to declare the king as lacking in virtue and incapable of governance. The priest also suggests that the king ought to be replaced by a better person, determined by all the advisors. The priest must also misinform the advisors that he has spoken to the rest of the cabinet who are in agreement with such a seditous plan.
Here it is crucial to note that kingship was not necessarily determined solely by lineage in classical India. A system of limited democracy seems to have prevailed amongst the elite members of the court. In other parts of the region, a rudimentary form of democracy allowed the people to choose and/or dethrone the ruler. This early system survived at least in some of the Rajputana till the medieval era, with documents from the Sisodia court at Chittorgarh suggesting that the nobles played a crucial part in the ascension of a king.
Chanakya continues with his "test of virtue" by explaining that once a traitor is identified, mostly by his/her gullibility and agreement to the plan proposed by the royal priest, the king should soon after ensnare that advisor in some scandal and relieve him of his post.
Here it is crucial to note that, in the whole process, the advisor is never confronted openly, nor is there any suggestion of a public trial. Instead, the advisor is simply dispatched, gently and on other pretexts. This route does allow the king a lot of discretion in not only removing an advisor from the cabinet but also re-instating them to an equal or higher post should the circumstances change.
The second test is the "test of greed" (or Artha). For this test, the king uses his military chief for a similar purpose, first dismissing him and then allowing him to incite other cabinet members to rebellion. The difference here is the motivation: unlike the priest who uses persuasion and accusations of a lack of virtue against the king, the military chief is granted state funds to lure any treacherous advisors. The military chief uses the spy services to contact the cabinet members, offering them lucre in exchange for their support. The traitors are again dismissed from their posts on false charges.
The third test is the "test of lust" (or Kama). For this test, the king makes use of a female ascestic who is closely linked with the royal family and the court. Indeed, in context of Chanakya's civil code which suggests an ease of divorces, prevalence of remarriages, as well as no particular disfavour attached to widowhood, this may suggest a possible area where middle-aged or older single women - widowed or divorced - were politically active.
The ascetic establishes contact with the advisors, and sets up a honey trap. She lures the advisor with sexual intimacy, but then offers potential for money, progress, status as rewards for the advisor revolting against the king.
The fourth technique is a "test of fear." For this, the king uses one advisor who organises a boat trip, hunting trip or some other entertainment. The king not only prohibits the entertainment but also insults the organiser publicly. After this, the kings' spies approach the disappointed and annoyed advisors in guise of young students who wish for an uprising against an unjust king.
In this final option, the use of students or "brahmacharis" or those who have not yet come of age is of particular interest. I have found no other explanation in other texts, but the verse itself suggests that this last technique may work best for the younger advisors who are likely to be angered or disappointed easily.
In the remaining verses, Chanakya specifies the kinds of tasks that should be granted to the advisors who pass each test. The phrasing of these verses suggests that the advisors may be re-instated in specific positions should they fail one test but succeed in another. One risk, to me at least, of this technique is that the king may spend his first months or year in office with constant cabinet reshuffles. But, perhaps, this is a less risky option than having poor or disloyal advisors occupying the wrong office.
I hope to post the second half of the chapter later in the week. Till then, keep well.
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