Beyond Sedition and Sleeper Cells: The Use of Unsatisfied Subjects in Enemy Lands (II)

First of all, apologies for not posting for a whole year on this blog. I haven't given up on the project. I have been working on a new novel since 2009 and finally last year it acquired the necessary momentum to reach the end. The manuscript has now gone to my agent and I hope to post news about its publication soon. You will be happy to know that my readings of Chanakya inform the new novel too.  But now, onwards....

Book 1, Chapter 13: 

The final third of this very long chapter outlines the ways of using subjects of enemy lands for one's own strategic and tactical gains.  In light of this month's Boston bombings, Chanakya's first suggestion is shockingly modern.  He suggests using spies and operatives who are either religious leaders or disguised as such or part of such institutions that most closely match the beliefs and habits of these discontent citizens.  The major difference for Chanakya, in this chapter, is that he is interested more in subverting prominent citizens who can cause significant strategic damage rather than tactical foot-soldiers who are discussed elsewhere.

He refers back to the three categories of those who can be lured into treason and sedition as those who are angry with the state, those who are terrified due to their own misdemeanours against the state and those who are greedy. Again, this is a reminder from the last blogpost on this chapter of the fear/greed structure Chanakya sets up early in his text.

He explains that those who are angry at their own government and king must be convinced that their state is not only brutal but also ready to trample their rights. To do this, secret operatives must convince them that the king is like a maddened elephant, ready to trample all those who come in his path. Moreover, the angry subjects should be convinced the king is surrounded by dishonest and immoral advisers (there are shades of US far right hysteria about President Obama here, first with health care reform, now with gun control attempts).  Spies should convince these angry subjects that given the state's propensity to act immorally, the citizenry must organise and prepare for their own protection and strike against the state first.

Officials and prominent citizens who are afraid of the king and state because of some misdemeanour or crime of their own, and terrified of the state's punishment must be approached by spies and convinced in a different manner. They must be convinced that an angry ruler is like an angry snake who will bite any who come in its path. (Aside: this chapter is far more replete with these animal analogies than any before).  Instead they must be convinced to withdraw their support from the state and king and instead establish links with another ruler and state who may be of assistance.

In case of greedy citizens (more on fear and greed as motivators in this chapter is mentioned in this blogpost), spies must lure them with flattery and promises of gain. And here comes another animal analogy: the spies must explain that just as Shukari, the mythic cow of the Chandalas (those who dispose of corpses, seen as unclean and of lower status) only provides milk for them and not for the Brahmins, the king only values and rewards those with lower status and ability. (NB: useful reminder of the complex matrix of 'status' in ancient India rather than the simplistic term 'caste' as I have discussed before).  Instead the greedy must be lured by promises of rewards from other kings and states who are promised to be more discerning of these citizens' qualities.

Once the spies have lured these three categories of discontented citizens of an enemy state, using the above motivations, the king should honour them and treat them with affection. The king may even lure them to his own kingdom and appoint them to high posts similar to the ones they held before. However, the king must not let down his guard with these citizens and instead assign watchers and spies to monitor them constantly.

Chanakya ends the chapter with a rather neatly rounded concluding verse. He points out that the citizens of an enemy state who can be 'broken' by greed, fear or anger should be brought over with inducements of reward or fear of punishment to one's own side. He also reminds that those citizens of the enemy state who are upstanding and loyal to their own king and state and cannot be broken,  must be destroyed by false smears and charges although ensuring that these can not be traced back to the king or his spies. He cautions again that the second category require a great deal of patience, again proving himself the proponent of the long game over immediate victories.  His final injunction in this chapter is again extremely modern as he recommends that regardless of all the activities of the espionage services, a dedicated propaganda effort must be maintained to constantly critique, malign and smear the enemy state and its policies.

This chapter like the rest of the section on espionage and propaganda is not only deeply pragmatic - as is characteristic of Chanakya's writings; he appears to be the world's first realist in many ways but is also ruthlessly focused on realpolitik. There is little space for ethical and moral considerations in Chanakya's view of statecraft, an aspect that has often discomfited his readers and contributed to his reputation for ruthlessness. In some ways, Chanakya's views on foreign policy seem more appropriate for a rising or strong empire, perhaps reflecting his own location as part of the Mauryan empire-builders. I am looking forward to seeing his discussions regarding states and kings who may be on the other side of the coin, as in weaker or poorer.

The next chapter focuses on specifics of managing the king's ministerial cabinet. It is equal parts policy, realpolitik and some brilliant suggestions that would surely come in handy for modern rulers. I hope to upload my reading of it soon. Until then, thank you for reading.

Structure and Role of the Intelligence Apparatus in Statecraft: Part 1

Chapter 10 and 11 of Book 1 comprise some of my favourites. However, they are very detailed and so require a short over view, especially as they cover so much ground that a straight reading and translation of the verses is not sufficient for understanding.

Both chapters cover the kinds of spies, their recruitment, roles, rewards, as well as structures of a king's espionage apparatus. Unfortunately either through time or due to loss of text, the sequence of discussion is particularly non-linear and therefore slightly confusing. But this may also be attributed to Chanakya's knowledge of certain activities and philosophies that he takes for granted and thus does not necessarily explain.

Chanakya begins by classifying nine different kinds of spies, each with a particular role and status. However, he also explains the structure of a state's intelligence apparatus, which he divides into two specific categories.

The first category is made up for five different kinds of spies that Chanakya describes as a king's five eyes. Interestingly enough, these first five are primarily deployed for internal intelligence and are meant to monitor the cabinet, influential persons of the realm as well as the general tendencies and levels of discontent in the populace. These first five are also distinguished by their primarily stationary deployment; that is, they are deployed for collecting intelligence in long-term, sometimes sleeper, capacities and are meant to report back to the king from their posts.

The second category, made up of four kinds of spies, are those who are deployed for short terms and in transitory capacity. These four kinds travel, move around, and may even be deployed in realms beyond their own.

Chanakya differentiates these two kinds of espionage by describing the first as "sanstha" and the second as "sanchaar." This may be considered an early form of dividing intelligence operators into headquarters vs field operatives, although Chanakya is quite clear that even the stationary, long term spies must have only limited knowledge of other parts of the intelligence apparatus. This, in many ways, is a function more of size than modernity, as maintaining a small core of intelligence analysts who could make sense of the information sent back is only possible when a small amount of data is generated.

However, Chanakya is quite modern on another aspect: he is quite emphatic about limiting the ways in which information is transmitted, as well as, on the paramount importance of maintaining minimum contact between different levels of espionage hierarchy. In practical terms, this means that the stationary spies communicate with only the layer above them and do not know of the various other members of the apparatus. Similarly, the high status spies - business leaders, aristocrats or intellectual - only communicate with the head of intelligence or directly with the king.

Moreover, Chanakya suggests that all kinds of people, including students, teachers, ascetics, entertainers, jugglers, beggars, traders, farmers, and so on can be recruited to serve as spies with different roles, inducements and rewards. Here it must be noted that Chanakya also makes a clear case for not only recruiting members of all classes and "castes" but also insists that spies be able to take on the necessary markers of other classes and "castes" as required (a prescient take on Rudyard Kipling's fantastic Kim here).

He is also surprisingly inclusive regarding the use of mentally and physically disabled people for gathering intelligence, acknowledging in a deeply practical manner, that many of these are least likely to be suspected. This also echoes Chanakya's organisation of the king's internal circles of protection which also include the physically and mentally challenged. In this second case, Chanakya is even more brutal in his reasoning, pointing out that gratitude may make such defenders more fierce in their loyalty to the king and thus better equipped than the able-bodied warriors.

One final point in this overview of the intelligence structure explained by Chanakya must be made as it again contradicts the simplistic notions that women were necessarily isolated or indeed marginalised in classical Indian society. Not only does Chanakya list women in the listing of nine kinds of spies, he also gives them an interesting and key mandate.

According to Chanakya, women spies must be the only conduit of information between the stationary and roaming branches of espionage, thus forming the sole crucial link between the two branches of intelligence gathering. Furthermore, in case of the "sanchaari" (roaming) spies, he insists that women spies have the responsibility of transmitting and/or transferring the gathered information to the king. In fact, Chanakya spends a fair amount of time explaining all the tactics by which the female spy can be contacted and given information by the other members of the espionage team.

This final point regarding the use of female spies flies in the face of modern (and primarily Western inspired) structures of intelligence agencies which use women for honey traps but have rarely given them executive power (the former MI5 chief is one exception). However, it echoes the view that informs the Russian security policy of "shoot the women first" in counter-insurgency operations. Chanakya makes the point elsewhere in the text which is shared at least in part by the modern Russian state that women warriors (and obviously spies) are more loyal and committed to the cause.

While I will take up the specifics of Chanakya's view on the intelligence apparatus in the next couple of posts, I believe that the most salient point raised by these chapters, is the inclusivity shown by the text which contradicts some of the post-imperialist ideas of ancient Indian history, developed over the past 200 years.