Book 1, Chapter 12
After that long hiatus, back to this massive tome. No more excuses as the regular readers will already know that far too often my job, hectic life and other writing assignments get in the way of this blog. Still, I do offer my apologies for the delay.
This chapter begins to exemplify Chanakya's reputation as a wily and ruthless political operator. He focusses on ways of gathering information on public discontent and dissent, prescribes ways of dealing with this, and ends with a crucial bit of warning for the ruler.
He begins by explaining that having appointed an intelligence network to gather information on key officials, priests, advisors, a ruler should start a network of informers who can gather information on the public.
The initial verses are quite specific, advising that the ruler assign two groups of spies to public areas. He includes religious sites and events, public meetings, political and religious events, entertainment areas as well as any place of significant public gathering and interaction. He recommends that the two groups of spies (more aptly agent provocateurs) mingle with the crowds and take opposing sides in opining about the ruler. One group of these agent provocateurs praises the king's policies and performance while the other critiques the ruler for harsh punishments - and wait for this terrifically modern gem - tax collection.
Both sides ought to judge the responses of the crowd, noting their support or opposition to both views. Having established the views of the populace, the pro-ruler faction should attempt to convince the opposition of the ruler's justice. This wonderful moment of PR and spin in the ancient world is also intriguingly rich in details. Chanakya suggests that the pro-ruler side explain that the earlier times were marked by anarchy and rule of force, and the state/king were created by the gods to ensure peace, stability and the rule of law.
For the same reason, and to facilitate the smooth functioning of the state, the ancient sages decreed that the state must receive one-sixth of agricultural produce and one-tenth of commercial profits and a small portion of gold from its citizens. Indeed as he points out that even the ascetics must contribute to the state, paying one-sixth of whatever they have collected in the forest or through alms to the state (this final point may be a useful reminder to all the various religion ashrams, churches and madrasas in India!). Even the saints, Chanakya points out, agree that the ruler who protects them is eligible for collecting taxes.
Similarly, the pro-ruler faction of agent provocateurs must explain to the populace that harsh laws and punishments are not arbitrary or unjust, but rather a way of ensuring safety of the citizens' life, honour and property, as well as to discourage criminals.
Here Chanakya takes a tangent into providing a reminder of a king's divine status, pointing out that a ruler (with an implicit assumption that he/she is a just one) is Indra's representative on earth and therefore critiquing him is akin to criticising the gods. Curiously, Chanakya does not provide an older theological or philosophical reference for this idea which makes me wonder if this isn't his own idea of spin.
Moving on, he continues that while keeping the populace supportive of the ruler is part of the spies' duty, they must also assess and identify any discontent or dissent.
He explains that there are citizens who aid the king with property, gold and monies, but also with their attempts to calm dissent. These citizens try to prevent revolt and nullify opposition to the king through not only their material resources but also by their active ability to persuade others. The king must keep an eye on such loyal citizens and reward them frequently with honours, money and other means. The king must also attempt to win back any citizen(s) who may be discontent with the king, using a host of means including persuasion and rewards.
There will of course be a category of discontent citizens who cannot be won back by the king, despite his/her best efforts. Here Chanakya demonstrates his ruthless streak, advising that the ruler create confusion in their ranks, turning one against the other until any revolt is neutralised. The ruler may also accuse these dissenters of tax evasion or treason, thus spoiling their reputations as respected citizens. Finally, once the public opinion has turned against these citizens, the ruler ought to have them killed in ways that can be written off as accidents or suicides. Another way to deal with determined dissenters is to force them into exile as well as turn their friends, associates and relatives against them.
Chanakya points out that it is common that prominent citizens who are afraid or angry with the ruler join the enemy, either internal or external. Such citizens are also quick to join conspiracies or plots against the state. One way of dealing with such citizens is for the king to appoint them to the court or palace posts, thus keeping them (and often their loved ones) in his/her control. Another possibility is that should they not agree to be part of the royal service, these prominent citizens may be held prisoners. Similarly, they may also be sent to far off mines or projects where they are not only at risk but also will lose contact with any and all collaborators.
Chanakya repeats the need for a ruler to use both reward and punishment to motivate citizens (fear and greed principle at work in ancient times). He points out that rewards not only work as sweeteners for those who receive them but also are an inspiration to others. Again, he recommends the use of the four pillars of governance, saam-daam-dand-bhed principles for keeping the populace in his favour.
The chapter ends with a warning to the ruler. Chanakya warns the ruler to remain alert towards the opinions of the populace, recommmending swift measure to neutralise any dissent. He points out that just as a rope woven of many fragments can be strong enough to restrain a maddened elephant, many weak and poor citizens joined together can be strong enough to bring down the ruler.
This coded warning is intriguing in part as it suggests that Chanakya was well aware of the principles of "rule by consent" even in this period and aware that a popular rebellion could overturn the most entrenched royal rule. Once again, a most modern thinker indeed!
The next chapter continues with the idea of managing dissent, in particular focussing on managing and neutralising those who are strongly opposed. Hope to continue posting on that soon.
Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts
Friday, 20 January 2012
Thursday, 27 January 2011
More On An Ancient Intelligence Apparatus
Book 1, Chapter 10
Before launching into this chapter, I would like to thank all those who read and comment on this blog, as well as those who email their thoughts and reactions to me.
Also, a clarification: this blog is not a translation; nor is it in any way meant to be an “authoritative” study or analysis of Chanakya’s text. I am using various translations and versions to do one simple thing: record my personal responses to this seminal political text. In the process, I hope that more people are made aware of the incredible worth and value of this book.
Far too often, in contemporary India, we treat our classical texts either with a Macauley-ist disdain or with unwarranted reverence. The unfortunate result of both these responses is that many of us no longer have access to these incredible documents of our ancient culture. This blog attempts to do something very personal: demystify and thus decolonise ancient political thought through an individual reading and thus bring it to more modern readers.
And so, onwards:
The first of two chapters on establishing an intelligence system explains the five kinds of spies who occupy relatively stationary, long term posts and are primarily used for gathering internal intelligence.
The fascinating point that Chanakya emphasises repeatedly is that the contact of government officials with spies must be limited as much as possible. Only the ruler or a very small number of trusted advisors should have contact with the spies, and must do so in complete secrecy. This is especially important as Chanakya suggests the use of spies for purposes of not only gathering information but also as an aspect of statecraft which may be deployed to entrap opposition, convince populace of specific aims and ideas, as well as use them as agent provocateurs to create controlled disturbances which may be of benefit to the state.
What is also intriguing in this chapter is Chanakya’s very modern use of the varieties of potential spies. The five explicit categories include students and/or intellectuals, unsuccessful businessmen, farmers, ascetics (or at least spies disguised as these), and women.
The first of these categories, according to Chanakya, include students. These, in addition to their intellectual capacities, should be bold even brash, argumentative and capable of eliciting information from others. These may include students or those involved in research, teaching, intellectual activity at a university or institute of higher learning.
Chanakya suggests that such students be recruited directly by the chief of intelligence services and only report to the chief and the ruler. Moreover, these spies ought to be regularly rewarded in cash and in honours. This seems very modern of Chanakya and throws open an entire possibility of ancient scholars not only working at universities but also benefitting from intelligence sharing, a practice quite prevalent in many western nations. Indian intelligence establishment could benefit from a revival of this ancient practice!
Interestingly, these students are intended to report on discontent and conspiracies developing amongst the youth. It seems that regardless of Europe’s soixante huitards, political analysts have long viewed students with suspicion, most likely with probably cause.
I must confess that suddenly the ancient Nalanda university gains a political science dimension that I had not considered before. Of course, given Chanakya’s own apparent link with the university at Takshashila, this comes as no surprise.
The second category of the five extends the intelligence apparatus to ascetics, especially those renowned for their intelligence and knowledge. Most curious, however, is Chanakya’s role for these. He recommends that such an ascetic be aided by the state in setting up a network of other ascetics who report on matters across the land. In return, these informants are paid in cash and material comforts. Indeed, the chief ascetic of the operation ought to have access not only to funds but also know-how in areas of animal husbandry, farming and small business, especially through the use of earlier mentioned student spies.
This is fascinating not only for the use of ascetics and religious figures for purposes of the state, but also for its absolutely pragmatic view that these may serve as apt conduits of information.
A secondary aspect that is quite impressive is the cohesion of network that emerges – despite the textual disruptions – in the organisation. University students provide the know-how in their fields to ascetics, just as other farmers, traders and craftsmen benefit from the information. What emerges in this description is a seamless understanding of how various aspects of the society may be linked and interconnected for purposes of gathering information.
The third category – and a logical one for an ancient agrarian society – includes spies who are drawn from ranks of impoverished farmers or disguise themselves as such. These farmer-spies are again paid by the state and expected to report on the loyalties and discontents of the farming communities. In addition, the farmer-spy is expected to create a network of informants drawn not only from amongst the farmers (and thus, presumedly, landowners) but also amongst the farm labourers.
The fourth category links up to the farmers, as it draws on the traders and business communities. Here, Chanakya again suggests recruiting an impoverished or unsuccessful trader and/or businessman. These spies are not only expected to recruit a network of business informants but also use their travels for business to gather intelligence on other entrepreneurs, market conditions and discontents.
The final category links back to the role of ascetics and are concerned with religious leaders who live in ashrams. However, here the instructions are far more specific: these religious leaders are expected to establish a peaceful and attractive ashram near major urban centres.
Initially, they should at least provide the impression of austerity. This practice of visible austerity is meant not for any spiritual purpose but rather to impress the local populace and diminish the respect they have for any other local ashram or teacher.
Interestingly enough, the ashram should make use of other spies to not only discover secrets of the populace but also the weakness of other religious institutions and leaders. These secrets can then be utilised for fortune-telling, counselling and persuasion (sounds like blackmail, but if it works…). The guru ought to also conspire with the state in order to predict accidents and calamities which can then be ‘proven’ by action on part of the state. From some of the commentaries on the text, these predicted acts seem to include acts of arson, poisoning and mysterious deaths which are obviously assassinations carried out by the state.
Within the text itself, the examples of ‘fortune-telling’ include predicting government honours and rewards for specific citizens which have been agreed upon earlier with the state. This may appear devious but logical if convoluted pragmatism embodied by the text.
Indeed the pragmatism of the text extends to the final verses of this chapter which explain the suggested course of action based on the internal intelligence provided by this spy network.
Chanakya suggests that should intelligence reveal that a citizen or organisation has been upset unintentionally by the ruler or the state, there must be an honest attempt made to address these complaints and bring the discontent elements back into the fold. The state may use rewards, economic reparations, or honours to allay a justifiable grievance.
However, in case of those who are discontent without justifiable reason, or cannot be persuaded otherwise, the state must use the intelligence apparatus to dispatch them. For this brutal if expedient remedy, the text suggests using accidents, apparently criminal assault or a confrontation between two opposing groups which may serve as cover for the assassination. (More on the art of assassination later as Chanakya goes into vast detail further on).
Before ending the chapter, Chanakya points out that a ruler ought to learn from the spies about those who are trustworthy and reward them appropriately. In contrast, the disloyal ought to be removed with as little fuss as possible as the ruler should not waste resources on them, and instead should focus on matter of the state and welfare of the people.
The next chapter deals with the second category of itinerant spies, with four specific classifications. Hope to get to that soon.
Before launching into this chapter, I would like to thank all those who read and comment on this blog, as well as those who email their thoughts and reactions to me.
Also, a clarification: this blog is not a translation; nor is it in any way meant to be an “authoritative” study or analysis of Chanakya’s text. I am using various translations and versions to do one simple thing: record my personal responses to this seminal political text. In the process, I hope that more people are made aware of the incredible worth and value of this book.
Far too often, in contemporary India, we treat our classical texts either with a Macauley-ist disdain or with unwarranted reverence. The unfortunate result of both these responses is that many of us no longer have access to these incredible documents of our ancient culture. This blog attempts to do something very personal: demystify and thus decolonise ancient political thought through an individual reading and thus bring it to more modern readers.
And so, onwards:
The first of two chapters on establishing an intelligence system explains the five kinds of spies who occupy relatively stationary, long term posts and are primarily used for gathering internal intelligence.
The fascinating point that Chanakya emphasises repeatedly is that the contact of government officials with spies must be limited as much as possible. Only the ruler or a very small number of trusted advisors should have contact with the spies, and must do so in complete secrecy. This is especially important as Chanakya suggests the use of spies for purposes of not only gathering information but also as an aspect of statecraft which may be deployed to entrap opposition, convince populace of specific aims and ideas, as well as use them as agent provocateurs to create controlled disturbances which may be of benefit to the state.
What is also intriguing in this chapter is Chanakya’s very modern use of the varieties of potential spies. The five explicit categories include students and/or intellectuals, unsuccessful businessmen, farmers, ascetics (or at least spies disguised as these), and women.
The first of these categories, according to Chanakya, include students. These, in addition to their intellectual capacities, should be bold even brash, argumentative and capable of eliciting information from others. These may include students or those involved in research, teaching, intellectual activity at a university or institute of higher learning.
Chanakya suggests that such students be recruited directly by the chief of intelligence services and only report to the chief and the ruler. Moreover, these spies ought to be regularly rewarded in cash and in honours. This seems very modern of Chanakya and throws open an entire possibility of ancient scholars not only working at universities but also benefitting from intelligence sharing, a practice quite prevalent in many western nations. Indian intelligence establishment could benefit from a revival of this ancient practice!
Interestingly, these students are intended to report on discontent and conspiracies developing amongst the youth. It seems that regardless of Europe’s soixante huitards, political analysts have long viewed students with suspicion, most likely with probably cause.
I must confess that suddenly the ancient Nalanda university gains a political science dimension that I had not considered before. Of course, given Chanakya’s own apparent link with the university at Takshashila, this comes as no surprise.
The second category of the five extends the intelligence apparatus to ascetics, especially those renowned for their intelligence and knowledge. Most curious, however, is Chanakya’s role for these. He recommends that such an ascetic be aided by the state in setting up a network of other ascetics who report on matters across the land. In return, these informants are paid in cash and material comforts. Indeed, the chief ascetic of the operation ought to have access not only to funds but also know-how in areas of animal husbandry, farming and small business, especially through the use of earlier mentioned student spies.
This is fascinating not only for the use of ascetics and religious figures for purposes of the state, but also for its absolutely pragmatic view that these may serve as apt conduits of information.
A secondary aspect that is quite impressive is the cohesion of network that emerges – despite the textual disruptions – in the organisation. University students provide the know-how in their fields to ascetics, just as other farmers, traders and craftsmen benefit from the information. What emerges in this description is a seamless understanding of how various aspects of the society may be linked and interconnected for purposes of gathering information.
The third category – and a logical one for an ancient agrarian society – includes spies who are drawn from ranks of impoverished farmers or disguise themselves as such. These farmer-spies are again paid by the state and expected to report on the loyalties and discontents of the farming communities. In addition, the farmer-spy is expected to create a network of informants drawn not only from amongst the farmers (and thus, presumedly, landowners) but also amongst the farm labourers.
The fourth category links up to the farmers, as it draws on the traders and business communities. Here, Chanakya again suggests recruiting an impoverished or unsuccessful trader and/or businessman. These spies are not only expected to recruit a network of business informants but also use their travels for business to gather intelligence on other entrepreneurs, market conditions and discontents.
The final category links back to the role of ascetics and are concerned with religious leaders who live in ashrams. However, here the instructions are far more specific: these religious leaders are expected to establish a peaceful and attractive ashram near major urban centres.
Initially, they should at least provide the impression of austerity. This practice of visible austerity is meant not for any spiritual purpose but rather to impress the local populace and diminish the respect they have for any other local ashram or teacher.
Interestingly enough, the ashram should make use of other spies to not only discover secrets of the populace but also the weakness of other religious institutions and leaders. These secrets can then be utilised for fortune-telling, counselling and persuasion (sounds like blackmail, but if it works…). The guru ought to also conspire with the state in order to predict accidents and calamities which can then be ‘proven’ by action on part of the state. From some of the commentaries on the text, these predicted acts seem to include acts of arson, poisoning and mysterious deaths which are obviously assassinations carried out by the state.
Within the text itself, the examples of ‘fortune-telling’ include predicting government honours and rewards for specific citizens which have been agreed upon earlier with the state. This may appear devious but logical if convoluted pragmatism embodied by the text.
Indeed the pragmatism of the text extends to the final verses of this chapter which explain the suggested course of action based on the internal intelligence provided by this spy network.
Chanakya suggests that should intelligence reveal that a citizen or organisation has been upset unintentionally by the ruler or the state, there must be an honest attempt made to address these complaints and bring the discontent elements back into the fold. The state may use rewards, economic reparations, or honours to allay a justifiable grievance.
However, in case of those who are discontent without justifiable reason, or cannot be persuaded otherwise, the state must use the intelligence apparatus to dispatch them. For this brutal if expedient remedy, the text suggests using accidents, apparently criminal assault or a confrontation between two opposing groups which may serve as cover for the assassination. (More on the art of assassination later as Chanakya goes into vast detail further on).
Before ending the chapter, Chanakya points out that a ruler ought to learn from the spies about those who are trustworthy and reward them appropriately. In contrast, the disloyal ought to be removed with as little fuss as possible as the ruler should not waste resources on them, and instead should focus on matter of the state and welfare of the people.
The next chapter deals with the second category of itinerant spies, with four specific classifications. Hope to get to that soon.
Wednesday, 25 November 2009
A Kings Education: Importance of Vedic Knowledge
Note to earlier post: Having considered the book once again I believe I should be talking in terms of Book 1, Chapter 1 instead of chapters and sections. So this post onwards, the posts shall discuss books, chapters, verses.
Book 1, Chapter 2: The range of Vedic knowledge required by a king.
This chapter is more complex, taking on issues of the four varnas (NB: no, I won't use the term "caste" which actually says very little about the organisation of Hindu society and reflects far more about the European one which coined the term initially and then exported it willy-nilly to India). It also takes on the issues of duties during the four ashrams or stages of life. It also advises specific behaviour for a king regarding these two points.
The chapter begins with a verse that lists the most important knowledge for a king:
1. These include the three Vedas: Rg, Yajur and Sama;
2. Chanakya also adds Atharva Veda to the list here. I assume its because the Atharva Veda already existed at this point and provides crucial commentary required for understanding the other three. Interestingly, he adds this fourth in conjunction with "itihaas" or history.
3. He includes history in this verse as necessary for a king. Some modern commentaries seem to suggest that Chanakya was referring solely to the Mahabharata as "history" but it seems more logical to assume that he was also referring to knowledge of lineages, battles, past events.
Interestingly he explains in the next verse that an cultured man comprises of the following six areas : education (sometimes translated as phonetics), ritual and ceremonial requirements, grammar (or language as a whole), etymological interpretation (or making meaning), ability to create and understand verse, and astronomy. These six form a humans body parts, including eye, mouth, heart, feet, heart and here I am stumped: something called "nasika." Any ideas on this one?
Update: As Rishabh points below: the missing sense and word is nose. Doh!
Then Chanakya moves on to explaining that the Vedas explain the necessary duties for the four varnas: Brahman, Kshatriya, Vaishya and Shudra. According to his list, these include the following:
Brahmans must study the Vedas and ancient texts, must teach curious students and advise patrons, must carry out necessary rituals, and preside as priests at rituals carried out by the patrons.
Moreover, they must give in charity what they can and receive patronage from those with material wealth. They are the only ones with the capacity to receive charity as well as the requirement to give charity.
Curiously enough, there is no indication from Chanakya that the students or patrons are limited by varnas.
Kshatriyas must also study the Vedas, get rituals and ceremonies done by the Brahmins, give in charity, make a living out of their martial ability and protect the people.
Again, curious that Chanakya points to charity as a key duty for a Kshatriya. I am reminded of the Jain belief that only a Kshatriya is capable of being the Mahavira as such a great spirit is marked by a limitless ability to give of oneself.
The Vaishyas are required to study the Vedas, support rituals and ceremonies (I assume by giving money), give charity, carry out agriculture, animal husbandry and trade.
And finally the Shudras are required to serve the "twice born" (Brahman, Kshatriya and Vaishya): this seems to be where most European translators stopped reading and declare the Shudras as the downtrodden, proleteriat and so forth.
But Chanakya continues his list by pointing out that the Shudras are also responsible for agriculture, animal husbandry and trade. Moreover, they are also artists and artisans, performers and actors, as well as poets.
Indeed, despite the infamous Manusmriti's often vile and limiting strictures on society, that text does point out that all humans are born as Shudras, and it is only after education and ritual "second-birth" that a human may be counted as Brahman, Kshatriya or Vaishya.
In contrast, Chanakya's view seems more liberal and appears to imply that Shudras - having acquired knowledge and education - are as capable of being "twice born" as all others. This means that acquiring the right training could allow anyone to become a priest or a warrior or a trader. This appears to be more logical given Chanakya's real-politik stance on the running of a state.
This also appears to resonate also with the idea of Bharata's Natyashastra (treatise on drama) as the fifth Veda which is accessible to all humans. Thus technically even the artists and poets who studied only Bharata's text could be considered to be studying the Vedas, blurring the social lines in ways that contradict Manu's far more rigid stance.
Considering the various text, I wonder if rather than edicts, these were more in nature of debates on the classification and organisation of society, with Chanakya taking a proto-realist stance while Manu's appears to be a proto-Neocon one.
It also appears that these varna classifications were far more fluid than we have been brought up to believe in Chanakya's era. Does this mean that social conditions determine how strict or liberal the social categorization would be in Indian history?
Also, it throws open an interesting case in point for modernity (and me personally) in India: As a Kshatriya-born woman, who chooses to work as a writer, do I count as a Shudra? Especially since I don't remember ever undergoing a "yagyopaveet" (second-birth) ceremony!
Does this also mean that a Shudra who found a guru, studied the Vedas, became a warrior and acquired the practise of sacrifice and charity could be a Kshatriya. The story of Eklavya really resonates here with me: wouldn't he be the perfect warrior and thus the perfect Kshatriya in the Mahabharata?
This reading is throwing up a lot of questions! And all feedback would be welcome.
The next post will take on the next set of verses in this chapter as they are really making me questions a lot of what I know and think about ancient India.
Book 1, Chapter 2: The range of Vedic knowledge required by a king.
This chapter is more complex, taking on issues of the four varnas (NB: no, I won't use the term "caste" which actually says very little about the organisation of Hindu society and reflects far more about the European one which coined the term initially and then exported it willy-nilly to India). It also takes on the issues of duties during the four ashrams or stages of life. It also advises specific behaviour for a king regarding these two points.
The chapter begins with a verse that lists the most important knowledge for a king:
1. These include the three Vedas: Rg, Yajur and Sama;
2. Chanakya also adds Atharva Veda to the list here. I assume its because the Atharva Veda already existed at this point and provides crucial commentary required for understanding the other three. Interestingly, he adds this fourth in conjunction with "itihaas" or history.
3. He includes history in this verse as necessary for a king. Some modern commentaries seem to suggest that Chanakya was referring solely to the Mahabharata as "history" but it seems more logical to assume that he was also referring to knowledge of lineages, battles, past events.
Interestingly he explains in the next verse that an cultured man comprises of the following six areas : education (sometimes translated as phonetics), ritual and ceremonial requirements, grammar (or language as a whole), etymological interpretation (or making meaning), ability to create and understand verse, and astronomy. These six form a humans body parts, including eye, mouth, heart, feet, heart and here I am stumped: something called "nasika." Any ideas on this one?
Update: As Rishabh points below: the missing sense and word is nose. Doh!
Then Chanakya moves on to explaining that the Vedas explain the necessary duties for the four varnas: Brahman, Kshatriya, Vaishya and Shudra. According to his list, these include the following:
Brahmans must study the Vedas and ancient texts, must teach curious students and advise patrons, must carry out necessary rituals, and preside as priests at rituals carried out by the patrons.
Moreover, they must give in charity what they can and receive patronage from those with material wealth. They are the only ones with the capacity to receive charity as well as the requirement to give charity.
Curiously enough, there is no indication from Chanakya that the students or patrons are limited by varnas.
Kshatriyas must also study the Vedas, get rituals and ceremonies done by the Brahmins, give in charity, make a living out of their martial ability and protect the people.
Again, curious that Chanakya points to charity as a key duty for a Kshatriya. I am reminded of the Jain belief that only a Kshatriya is capable of being the Mahavira as such a great spirit is marked by a limitless ability to give of oneself.
The Vaishyas are required to study the Vedas, support rituals and ceremonies (I assume by giving money), give charity, carry out agriculture, animal husbandry and trade.
And finally the Shudras are required to serve the "twice born" (Brahman, Kshatriya and Vaishya): this seems to be where most European translators stopped reading and declare the Shudras as the downtrodden, proleteriat and so forth.
But Chanakya continues his list by pointing out that the Shudras are also responsible for agriculture, animal husbandry and trade. Moreover, they are also artists and artisans, performers and actors, as well as poets.
Indeed, despite the infamous Manusmriti's often vile and limiting strictures on society, that text does point out that all humans are born as Shudras, and it is only after education and ritual "second-birth" that a human may be counted as Brahman, Kshatriya or Vaishya.
In contrast, Chanakya's view seems more liberal and appears to imply that Shudras - having acquired knowledge and education - are as capable of being "twice born" as all others. This means that acquiring the right training could allow anyone to become a priest or a warrior or a trader. This appears to be more logical given Chanakya's real-politik stance on the running of a state.
This also appears to resonate also with the idea of Bharata's Natyashastra (treatise on drama) as the fifth Veda which is accessible to all humans. Thus technically even the artists and poets who studied only Bharata's text could be considered to be studying the Vedas, blurring the social lines in ways that contradict Manu's far more rigid stance.
Considering the various text, I wonder if rather than edicts, these were more in nature of debates on the classification and organisation of society, with Chanakya taking a proto-realist stance while Manu's appears to be a proto-Neocon one.
It also appears that these varna classifications were far more fluid than we have been brought up to believe in Chanakya's era. Does this mean that social conditions determine how strict or liberal the social categorization would be in Indian history?
Also, it throws open an interesting case in point for modernity (and me personally) in India: As a Kshatriya-born woman, who chooses to work as a writer, do I count as a Shudra? Especially since I don't remember ever undergoing a "yagyopaveet" (second-birth) ceremony!
Does this also mean that a Shudra who found a guru, studied the Vedas, became a warrior and acquired the practise of sacrifice and charity could be a Kshatriya. The story of Eklavya really resonates here with me: wouldn't he be the perfect warrior and thus the perfect Kshatriya in the Mahabharata?
This reading is throwing up a lot of questions! And all feedback would be welcome.
The next post will take on the next set of verses in this chapter as they are really making me questions a lot of what I know and think about ancient India.
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